Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative

Abstract

Glymour's theory of bootstrap confirmation is a purely qualitative account of confirmation; it allows us to say that the evidence confirms a given theory, but not that it confirms the theory to a certain degree. The present paper extends Glymour's theory to a quantitative account and investigates the resulting theory in some detail. It also considers the question how bootstrap confirmation relates to justification.

Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism

“…The response to this problem will already be clear. It simply points to the fact that the contradiction arises because the person is supposed to realize that she has t-evidence for (20), a supposition that, as we explained, may well be false.…”

“…But again more must be said, for here too it might already seem inconsistent to suppose that we could have t-evidence for (20). For-one might argueaccording to (21) it is possible that at some time it holds for some set S of evidence sentences that S constitutes t-evidence for (20) relative to some Pr that satisfies our desiderata. But suppose this possibility obtains.…”

“…Our first response to this problem is basically the same as the first response to the previous problem: That (20) would be falsified were we to obtain t-evidence for it is consistent with the assumption that the sentence is true, even if that entails the possibility of getting t-evidence for it. But again more must be said, for here too it might already seem inconsistent to suppose that we could have t-evidence for (20).…”

“…While this response is sufficient to divert the threat to probabilistic antirealism posed by (20), let me add, albeit more tentatively, a response of a rather different nature which may well work even if we assume that rational…”

Evidence, Explanation, and the Empirical Status of Scientific Realism

“…6 Depending on the exact theory of (simple, non-bootstrap) confirmation that is assumed, Condition 2 is superfluous in the face of the requirement that the theory and evidence be jointly consistent. For further comments on and discussion of Definition 3.1, the reader is referred to Douven (2002) and Douven and Meijs (2005). 7 See, e.g., various of the contributions to Churchland and Hooker's (1985) collection (especially Churchland's, Giere's, Musgrave's, and Wilson's); also Devitt (1991) and Psillos (1999).…”