Bootstrapping and maintaining trust in the cloud

Schear, Nabíl; Cable, Patrick T.; Moyer, Thomas; Richard, Bryan; Rudd, Robert

doi:10.1145/2991079.2991104

Cited by 29 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Keylime: Keylime [47] M2 to obtain the kernel, but currently, we fetch the kernel from a web service stood up for this purpose.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Secure Cloud with Minimal Provider Trust

Mosayyebzadeh¹,

Ravago²,

Mohan³

et al. 2019

Preprint

Self Cite

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Bolted is a new architecture for a bare metal cloud with the goal of providing security-sensitive customers of a cloud the same level of security and control that they can obtain in their own private data centers. It allows tenants to elastically allocate secure resources within a cloud while being protected from other previous, current, and future tenants of the cloud. The provisioning of a new server to a tenant isolates a bare metal server, only allowing it to communicate with other tenant's servers once its critical firmware and software have been attested to the tenant. Tenants, rather than the provider, control the tradeoffs between security, price, and performance. A prototype demonstrates scalable end-to-end security with small overhead compared to a less secure alternative.

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“…Keylime: Keylime [47] M2 to obtain the kernel, but currently, we fetch the kernel from a web service stood up for this purpose.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Secure Cloud with Minimal Provider Trust

Mosayyebzadeh¹,

Ravago²,

Mohan³

et al. 2019

Preprint

Self Cite

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“…Google has their open-sourced implementation for remote attestation called go-attestation [6], which does not do platform attestation and start at AK as root of trust. Acadamic implementation called keylime [7] has support for multiple platforms and languages for attestation but it misses platform certificate validations, firmware and software even logs validations. all of the above solutions do not have support for replay or Denial of Service (DoS) attacks as they all work on https client-server protocols.…”

Section: A Tpm Based Remote Attestationmentioning

confidence: 99%

SEDAT:Security Enhanced Device Attestation with TPM2.0

Dave,

Wiseman,

Safford

2021

Preprint

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Remote attestation is one of the ways to verify the state of an untrusted device. Earlier research has attempted remote verification of a device's state using hardware, software, or hybrid approaches. Majority of them have used Attestation Key as a hardware root of trust, which does not detect hardware modification or couterfiet issues. In addition, they do not have a secure communication channel between verifier and prover, which makes them susceptible to mordern security attacks. This paper presents SEDAT, a novel methodology for remote attestation of the device via a security enhanced communication channel. SEDAT performs hardware, firmware, and software attestation. SEDAT enhances the communication protocol security between verifier and prover by using the Single Packet Authorization (SPA) technique, which provides replay and Denial of Service (DoS) protection. SEDAT provides a way for verifier to get ondemand device integrity and authenticity status via a secure channel. It also enables the verifier to detect counterfeit hardware, change in firmware, and software code on the device. SEDAT validates the manufacturer's root CA certificate, platform certificate, endorsement certificate (EK), and attributes certificates to perform platform hardware attestation. SEDAT is the first known tool that represents firmware, and Integrity Measurement Authority (IMA) event logs in the Canonical Event Logs (CEL) format (recommended by Trusted Computing Group). SEDAT is the first implementation, to the best of our knowledge, that showcases end to end hardware, firmware, and software remote attestation using Trusted Platform Module (TPM2.0) which is resilient to DoS and replay attacks. SEDAT is the first remote verifier that is capable of retrieving a TPM2.0 quote from prover and validate it after regeneration, using a software TPM2.0 quote check. All source code, tools, and kernel patches are open-sourced via BSD 2-Clause License.

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“…To address this issue we are working on a solution that relies on Trusted Platform Modules [65], which are tamper-resistant, discrete chips contained in some bare-metal nodes that give the node a cryptographic identity via a local public/private keypair. A security-sensitive tenant could use the TPM as part of a protocol to grant cryptographically-guarded access to M2 resources using attestation systems like [66], [67]. Such systems could also provide a defense against corrupted firmware.…”

Section: B Improved Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

M2: Malleable Metal as a Service

Mohan

Türk

Gudimetla

et al. 2018

2018 IEEE International Conference on Cloud Engineering (IC2E)

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Existing bare-metal cloud services that provide users with physical nodes have a number of serious disadvantage over their virtual alternatives, including slow provisioning times, difficulty for users to release nodes and then reuse them to handle changes in demand, and poor tolerance to failures. We introduce M2, a bare-metal cloud service that uses network-mounted boot drives to overcome these disadvantages. We describe the architecture and implementation of M2 and compare its agility, scalability and performance to existing systems. We show that M2 can reduce provisioning time by over 50% while offering richer functionality, and comparable run time performance with respect to tools that provision images into local disks. M2 is open source and available at https://github.com/CCI-MOC/ims. 1 Previous provisioning systems exploited remote storage in special purpose environments, like HPC clusters, where all nodes boot the same kernel.2 As the focus of this work is to improve the provisioning time M2 only network-mounts boot drives that hosts the OS and applications. Data drives are still hosted on the local disks.

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Bootstrapping and maintaining trust in the cloud

Cited by 29 publications

References 17 publications

A Secure Cloud with Minimal Provider Trust

A Secure Cloud with Minimal Provider Trust

SEDAT:Security Enhanced Device Attestation with TPM2.0

M2: Malleable Metal as a Service

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