Botnets

Tiirmaa-Klaar, Heli; Gassen, Jan; Gerhards-Padilla, Elmar; Martini, Peter

doi:10.1007/978-1-4471-5216-3

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…They are defined legal frameworks in which ISPs operate and include cyber-security laws and regulations, blacklisting, peer pressure, reputation effects, competitive cost pressure, cost of customer acquisition, and cost of technology mitigation [17]. Regulation -an effective incentive [18] -requires cyber security incidents be nationally mitigated [19] since national anti-botnet centre usually are hardly infected. National initiatives on botnet mitigation should therefore be promoted and good models circulated [20] while policy makers give ISPs more incentives for taking action [2].…”

Section: Institutional Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internet service providers responsibilities in botnet mitigation: a Nigerian perspective

Okesola

Adebiyi

Osi-Okeke

et al. 2020

IJECE

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Botnet-based attack is dangerous and extremely difficult to overcome as all the primary mitigation methods are passive and limited in focus. A combine efforts of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are better guides since they can monitor the traffic that traverse through their networks. However, ISPs are not legally banded to this role and may not view security as a primary concern. Towards understudying the involvement of ISPs in Botnet mitigation in Nigeria, this study elicited and summarized mitigation measures from scientific literatures to create a reference model which was validated by structured interview. Although, ISPs role is seen to be voluntary and poorly incentivized, the providers still take customers security very serious but concentrate more on preventive and notification measures.

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Section: Institutional Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internet service providers responsibilities in botnet mitigation: a Nigerian perspective

Okesola

Adebiyi

Osi-Okeke

et al. 2020

IJECE

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“…There are different kinds of blacklisting, although generally all blacklisting systems have a database of nodes from which any communication is refused (Tiirmaa-Klaar, Gassen, Gerhards-Padilla, & Martini, 2013). Blacklisting could be used in TOR to prevent known assailants from connecting to the network.…”

Section: Blacklistingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anonymous Communication on the Internet

2014

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There are many kinds of systems developed for anonymous communication on the internet. We survey a number of systems and evaluate their security. Among these systems we compare functionalities like Onion Routing, anonymous VPN services, probabilistic anonymity, and deterministic anonymity. Other types of anonymous communication such as messaging, peer-to-peer communication, web use, emailing, and use of other Internet applications are also presented. We follow up by presenting different types of attacks with the purpose of identifying anonymously communicating users. These attacks fall into the following categories: internal/external attacks, passive/active attacks, and static/adaptive attacks. We describe the following attacks as well as known protections against these attacks: predecessor attacks, intersection attacks, timing attacks, and Sybil attacks. Lastly we discuss design choices, operation, and security of the current TOR network -The 2G Onion Router. Access control methods to restrict malicious use of TOR are also proposed. In conclusions the significance of anonymous communication is outlined.

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“…Botnets podem se comportar como verdadeiras ameaças cibernéticas à globalização digital, uma vez que podem ser usadas para negar acesso a serviços online ou até mesmo roubar e destruir informações [1].…”

Section: Introductionunclassified