“…The results confirm that there is an endogeneity problem of the underwriter choice (TYPE) for both rights issues and open offers, and the largest shareholders self-select into their preferred issuing firms to be the SEO underwriters. 20 After 19 These variables include (i) the standard deviation of the residuals (SE) from a standard marketmodel regression as a proxy for the firm-specific risk (Denis 1991;Balachandran et al 2008;Pandes 2010); (ii) Beta (A_BETA), a proxy for underwriting risk that cannot be reduced by diversification (Ng and Smith 1996); (iii) the market-to-book ratio (Ln(M/B)), a proxy for potential growth prospects (D'Mello et al, 2003;Balachandran et al 2008); (iv) free cash flows-to-total assets ratio (FCF) is the corporate finance variable to examine the potential conflict between the largest shareholder and minority shareholders in a family-controlled firm, as proponed by Jensen (1986); (v) a dummy variable CONS that equals to one if the offer is involved in share consolidations as part of capital reorganizations of an issuing firm and zero otherwise. It serves as a proxy for financing conditions and firm quality (Armitage 2002;Ursel 2006); (vi) Ln(EX_DAY) could measure the complexity level and price risk of an offer; (vii) the dividend yield (DIV), a firm quality proxy (Denis 1994;Wu et al 2005); (viii) return on assets (ROA), a proxy for firm quality; (ix) price discount (DIS), a proxy for firm quality (Heinkel and Schwartz 1986;Slovin et al 2000); (x) both the firm age (Ln(AGE)) and the firm size (Ln(F_SIZE)) are used as the proxies for the level of information asymmetries (Wu et al 2005); (xi) the ratio of gross proceeds to the market value of an issuing firm (R_SIZE) to measure the size of investment opportunities relative to firm size (Slovin et al 2000); and (xii) METHOD, MARKET, and FIN, as defined earlier, are the rest of control variables.…”