Bradley’s Regress: Meinong versus Bergmann

Relational Order and Onto-Thematic Roles

“…..]" can be taken to stand for the very same exemplification relation. As far as the recourse to exemplification relations go, it is worth noting that, if one considers appropriate to distinguish between a fact, e.g., (5), and a corresponding "exemplification fact," *Socrates exemplifies wisdom* (Orilia 2007, Gaskin 2008, the relational order of the latter can still be explained by a recourse to o-roles. That is, *Socrates exemplifies wisdom* should be taken to involve an exemplification relation with the attributive o-role and Socrates and *wisdom* with two distinct argument o-roles.…”

Positions, Ordering Relations and O-Roles

“…Option (i) gives rise to an internalist version of Bradley's regress and option (ii) to an externalist version of the regress. The former is indeed vicious, but the latter fortunately is not (Orilia , , Gaskin , section 78). By embracing it, one gets to the view that I find more congenial, which I call fact infinitism .…”

Bradley's Regress and Ungrounded Dependence Chains: A Reply to Cameron

“…involving a universal and one or more particulars, depending on whether the universal is a property or a relation). This approach is basically the ‘fact infinitism’ that I have recently defended in previous publications (Orilia 2006, 2007). 1 Its basic idea is to accept the externalist version of the regress as not merely benign, but instead as positively leading to an account of the unity of facts: the fact Fa exists (as a unity, in addition to its constituents F and a ), because another fact, namely E 2 Fa also exists (where E 2 is dyadic exemplification); in turn, E 2 Fa exists, because the fact E 3 E 2 Fa , distinct form E 2 Fa , also exists (where E 3 is triadic exemplification), and so on ad infinitum .…”

“…We noted above the link between ontological dependence and explanation. Given this link, the objections that I have raised elsewhere (Orilia 2006, 2007) against the attempts to show the untenability of ungrounded infinite explanatory chains provide additional support for C1.…”

“…Castañeda 1980), including views that deny that there are facts and admit tropes instead (cf. Simons 1997, Dodd 1999, Maurin 2008a) or that deny that an account of the unity of facts can be given (as perhaps in Van Inwagen 1993, 37; see Vallicella 2002 and Orilia 2007 for two critical surveys of different theoretical options, and Meinertsen 2008 and Betti and Wieland 2008 for two recent new standpoints). Once matters are seen in this perspective, an argument in favour of the (contingent) truth of WF can obviously count against fact infinitism and in favour of its rivals and thus the fact infinitist had better try and counter it.…”