Brain Activity in Fairness Consideration during Asset Distribution: Does the Initial Ownership Play a Role?

Abstract

Previous behavioral studies have shown that initial ownership influences individuals’ fairness consideration and other-regarding behavior. However, it is not entirely clear whether initial ownership influences the brain activity when a recipient evaluates the fairness of asset distribution. In this study, we randomly assigned the bargaining property (monetary reward) to either the allocator or the recipient in the ultimatum game and let participants of the study, acting as recipients, receive either disadvantageous unequal, equal, or advantageous unequal offers from allocators while the event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Behavioral results showed that participants were more likely to reject disadvantageous unequal and equal offers when they initially owned the property as compared to when they did not. The two types of unequal offers evoked more negative going ERPs (the MFN) than the equal offers in an early time window and the differences were not modulated by the initial ownership. In a late time window, however, the P300 responses to division schemes were affected not only by the type of unequal offers but also by whom the property was initially assigned to. These findings suggest that while the MFN may function as a general mechanism that evaluates whether the offer is consistent or inconsistent with the equity rule, the P300 is sensitive to top-down controlled processes, into which factors related to the allocation of attentional resources, including initial ownership and personal interests, come to play.

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“…Overall, a greater negativity of the FRN component was found in response to unfair offers than to fair offers (Polezzi et al, 2008;Wu et al, 2011Wu et al, , 2012Alexopoulos et al, 2012Alexopoulos et al, , 2013Qu et al, 2013); and more interestingly, also in response to extra-fair offers (i.e., shares superior to half the amount of money to split) compared to fair offers (Wu et al, 2012). The FRN has been shown to be sensitive to social expectancy and social norms violation in social paradigms (Boksem and DeCremer, 2010;Wu et al, 2012). To this extent, Wu et al (2012) proposed that non-equal offers (i.e., inferior or superior to the half-share) in the ultimatum game may constitute a particular case of social norm violation (i.e., equality expectancy violation) associated with a greater FRN effect compared to when the fairness norm is applied (i.e., a major negativity for non-equal shares than for equal shares).…”

“…Several studies recently investigated fairness consideration and the associated neural correlates using the ultimatum game paradigm (Polezzi et al, 2008;Campanhã et al, 2011;Wu et al, 2011Wu et al, , 2012Alexopoulos et al, 2012Alexopoulos et al, , 2013Qu et al, 2013). Overall, a greater negativity of the FRN component was found in response to unfair offers than to fair offers (Polezzi et al, 2008;Wu et al, 2011Wu et al, , 2012Alexopoulos et al, 2012Alexopoulos et al, , 2013Qu et al, 2013); and more interestingly, also in response to extra-fair offers (i.e., shares superior to half the amount of money to split) compared to fair offers (Wu et al, 2012).…”

“…Features such as humaneness (e.g., Van't Wout et al, 2006), physical attractiveness (e.g., Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999;Marchetti et al, 2011), intentionality (e.g., Sutter, 2007, possession of positive versus negative traits (e.g., Ruz et al, 2011;Marchetti et al, 2011;Gaertig et al, 2012;Qu et al, 2013), social ties (e.g., Campanhã et al, 2011), social comparison (Wu et al, 2011) or initial ownership (Wu et al, 2012) contribute importantly to modulate the responders' rejection behavior. Various studies investigated the impact of proposers' gender on the responder's behavior.…”

“…The FRN has been shown to be sensitive to social expectancy and social norms violation in social paradigms (Boksem and DeCremer, 2010;Wu et al, 2012). To this extent, Wu et al (2012) proposed that non-equal offers (i.e., inferior or superior to the half-share) in the ultimatum game may constitute a particular case of social norm violation (i.e., equality expectancy violation) associated with a greater FRN effect compared to when the fairness norm is applied (i.e., a major negativity for non-equal shares than for equal shares). Two studies also found a greater P300 amplitude in response to fair offers compared to unfair offers (Wu et al, 2012;Qu et al, 2013).…”

“…To this extent, Wu et al (2012) proposed that non-equal offers (i.e., inferior or superior to the half-share) in the ultimatum game may constitute a particular case of social norm violation (i.e., equality expectancy violation) associated with a greater FRN effect compared to when the fairness norm is applied (i.e., a major negativity for non-equal shares than for equal shares). Two studies also found a greater P300 amplitude in response to fair offers compared to unfair offers (Wu et al, 2012;Qu et al, 2013). The authors interpreted this effect to reflect the greater motivational significance to fair shares than to unfair shares.…”