Brain Death as the End of a Human Organism as a Self-moving Whole

Abstract

The biophilosophic justification for the idea that “brain death” (or total brain failure) is death needs to support two claims: (1) that what dies in human death is a human organism, not merely a psychological entity distinct from it; (2) that total brain failure signifies the end of the human organism as a whole. Defenders of brain death typically assume without argument that the first claim is true and argue for the second by defending the “integrative unity” rationale. Yet the integrative unity rationale has fallen on hard times. In this article, I give reasons for why we should think of ourselves as organisms, and why the “fundamental work” rationale put forward by the 2008 President’s Council is better than the integrative unity rationale, despite persistent objections to it.

How many ways can you die? Multiple biological deaths as a consequence of the multiple concepts of an organism

“…According to him, the work of self-preservation should be interpreted as a "second-order capacity (viz. a capacity for having a capacity) for self-movement towards species-specific ends" [6]. Note that the notion of "second-order capacity" is quite similar to Moschella's idea of "root capacity.…”

“…Recently, Adam Omelianchuk proposed a strategy to address this gap [6]. According to him, the work of self-preservation should be interpreted as a "second-order capacity (viz.…”

“…It also raises a pressing question: What apart from an organism's activity indicates that an organism as a whole exists? [6] Maureen L. Condic Of course, this [lack of rationality and global, self-integrated organismal function] in itself does not prove that a brain dead body is not a living human organism. More argumentation would be needed in order to show that (1) the capacity for global, self-integrated organismal function is necessary for the persistence of an organism [7] biology.…”

The inviolateness of life and equal protection: a defense of the dead-donor rule

“…Yet there has to be more than just sentiment involved. 21 Complex matters of personal identity and human ontology are at play in the ethics of killing, but there is good reason to believe that whatever the human person is, it has the ultimate capacity to live a biologically human life [61]. It is one thing for a PVS patient's friends and relatives to think that their loved one now lives a life not worth living or no longer exists as a person in some performative sense; it is quite another to think that their loved one is not there at all [62, p. 95].…”

Death as the extinction of the source of value: the constructivist theory of death as an irreversible loss of moral status

“…One of the less popular approaches within the definition of death debate defines death in terms of moral status [ 1 – 6 ]. In contrast to the proposal of defining death in purely biological terms (a mainstream position in the debate [ 7 – 11 ]) or by utilizing theories of personal identity [ 12 , 13 ], ‘the moral view on death,’ as I will call such an approach, remains relatively undeveloped. This article aims to address this gap by answering the Transitivity Argument formulated against the moral view on death.…”