The paper defends an Aristotelian notion of indeterminism, as rigorously formulated in the framework of branching space-times (BST) of Belnap (1992), against criticism by Earman's (2008) based on a model-theoretic characterization of indeterminism. It delineates BST branching against the background provided by Earman's (2008) distinction between individual versus ensemble branching. Partly in order to motivate our responses to Earman, it describes a construction of physically motivated BST models, in which histories are isomorphic to Minkowski spacetime. Finally it responds to Earman's criticisms leveled against BST by addressing a topological issue, the question of an actual future, the past/future asymmetry, and some semantical questions.Keywords Indeterminism/determinism · Spacetimes · Branching space-times · TensesIn current debates two different concepts of (in)determinism have been used, each having a different historical origin and each being applied in different fields. On the one hand, there is an everyday natural notion of (in)determinism, discussed first by Aristotle, and illustrated by alternative possible futures, one with a sea battle and the other without. On the other hand, there is a tradition started by Laplace, of characterizing