Breaking KeeLoq in a Flash: On Extracting Keys at Lightning Speed

Kasper, Markus; Kasper, Timo; Moradi, Amir; Paar, Christof

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02384-2_25

Cited by 36 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…The practical impact of this attack is tolerable, since it is comparable to duplicating a mechanical key, given physical access. The recovery of the manufacturer key (contained in all receivers of one manufacturer) is feasible with only one power measurement, without knowing neither plaintext nor ciphertext [KKMP09].…”

Section: Keeloqmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sweet Dreams and Nightmares: Security in the Internet of Things

Kasper

Oswald

Paar

2014

Information Security Theory and Practice. Securing the Internet of Things

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Abstract. Wireless embedded devices are predominant in the Internet of Things: Objects tagged with Radio Frequency IDentification and Near Field Communication technology, smartphones, and other embedded tokens interact from device to device and thereby often process information that is security or privacy relevant for humans. For protecting sensitive data and preventing attacks, many embedded devices employ cryptographic algorithms and authentication schemes. In the past years, various vulnerabilities have been found in commercial products that enable to bypass the security mechanisms. Since a large number of the devices in the field are in the hands of potential adversaries, implementation attacks (such as side-channel analysis and reverse engineering) can play a critical role for the overall security of a system. At hand of several examples of assailable commercial products we demonstrate the potential impact of the found security weaknesses and illustrate "how to not do it".

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Section: Keeloqmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sweet Dreams and Nightmares: Security in the Internet of Things

Kasper

Oswald

Paar

2014

Information Security Theory and Practice. Securing the Internet of Things

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“…Most notably the Mifare Classic, which has been thoroughly broken in the last few years [NESP08], [dKGHG08], [GdKGM + 08], [GvRVWS09], [Cou09]. Other prominent examples include KeeLoq [Bog07], [KKMP09], Megamos [VGE13] and Hitag2 [COQ09], [SNC09], [vN11], [SHXZ11], [VGB12] used in car keys, CryptoRF [GvRVWS10], [BKZ11], [BGV + 12] used in access control and payment systems and the A5/1 [Gol97], DECT [LST + 09] and GMR [DHW + 12] ciphers used in cordless/GSM phones. HID proposes iClass as a migration option for systems using Mifare Classic, boosting that iClass provides "improved security, performance and data integrity" 1 .…”

Section: Research Context and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wirelessly lockpicking a smart card reader

Garcia

Gans

Verdult

2014

Int. J. Inf. Secur.

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With more than 300 million cards sold, HID iClass is one of the most popular contactless smart cards on the market. It is widely used for access control, secure login and payment systems. The card uses 64-bit keys to provide authenticity and integrity. The cipher and key diversification algorithms used in iClass are proprietary and little information about them is publicly available. In this paper we have reverse engineered all security mechanisms in the card including cipher, authentication protocol and also key diversification algorithms, which we publish in full detail. Furthermore, we have found six critical weaknesses that we exploit in two attacks, one against iClass Standard and one against iClass Elite (a.k.a., iClass High Security). In order to recover a secret card key, the first attack requires one authentication attempt with a legitimate reader and 2 22 queries to a card. This attack has a computational complexity of 2 40 MAC computations. The whole attack can be executed within a day on ordinary hardware. Remarkably, the second attack which is against iClass Elite is significantly faster. It directly recovers the system wide master key from only 15 authentication attempts with a legitimate reader. The computational complexity of this attack is lower than 2 25 MAC computations, which means that it can be fully executed within 5 seconds on an ordinary laptop.

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“…In this case, referred to as single power analysis (SPA), the attacks consist indeed in the analysis of simple vertical variations. In [21], Kasper et al show how to break KeeLoq with SPA. Also, elliptic curve cryptography is especially vulnerable to both timing attacks and SPA, because the "double" and "add" operations in the inner iteration loop notably execute differently.…”

Section: B Typical Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vade mecum on side-channels attacks and countermeasures for the designer and the evaluator

Guilley

Meynard

Nassar

et al. 2011

2011 6th International Conference on Design &Amp; Technology of Integrated Systems in Nanoscale Era (DTIS)

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Abstract-Implementation-level attacks are nowadays well known and most designers of security embedded systems are aware of them. However, both the number of vulnerabilities and of protections have seriously grown since the first public reporting of these threats in 1996. It is thus difficult to assess the correct countermeasures association to cover all the possible attack pathes. The goal of this paper is to give a clear picture of the possible adequation between actually risks and mitigation techniques. A specific focus is made on two protection techniques addressing primarily side-channel attacks: masking and hiding. For the first time, we provide with a way to estimate a tradeoff depending on the environmental conditions (amount of noise) and on the designer skills (ability to balance the design). This tradeoff is illustrated in a decision diagram, helpful for the security designer to justify choices and to account for the cost overhead.

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Breaking KeeLoq in a Flash: On Extracting Keys at Lightning Speed

Cited by 36 publications

References 6 publications

Sweet Dreams and Nightmares: Security in the Internet of Things

Sweet Dreams and Nightmares: Security in the Internet of Things

Wirelessly lockpicking a smart card reader

Vade mecum on side-channels attacks and countermeasures for the designer and the evaluator

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