‘Breaking the backbone of farmers’: contestations in a rural employment guarantee scheme

Class and Social Policy: the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in Karnataka, India

“…Implementation has been delayed, partially fulfilled and blocked (Gill et al ; Kumbhar ). Labourers seeking greater implementation of the programme have been threatened with lock‐outs or exclusion from other poverty reduction programmes (Jakimow , 276, and below), and pro‐NREGS activists have been murdered (in several states, including Jharkhand and Odisha: Anon. ; Hard News ).…”

“…The second basis of antagonism surrounding NREGS relates to wage levels. It is widely claimed that NREGS puts upwards pressure on wages (NCEUS ; Drèze and Khera , 44; Khera ; Berg et al ; Reddy 2013, 145; Carswell and De Neve , 1; Jakimow , 271). The evidence base is varied, and includes village studies (Carswell and De Neve ), and longitudinal data sourced from as many as 19 different states suggesting a 5.3 per cent wage rise due to NREGS (Berg et al , 1).…”

“…Carswell and De Neve () are amongst those who explicitly locate wage rises in a broader discussion of ‘relations of production’, pointing out that labour's bargaining power at village level is increased by the growth of employment that is independent of local members of the dominant class. Heightened bargaining power in turn is credited with improving treatment by farmers, shortening working hours and reducing the likelihood of women being harassed by those who ‘pay’ their wages (Gill et al , 479; Reddy 2013, 145; Jakimow , 272). Labourers need to ask the dominant class for work and collect wages from them less often – thereby reducing the frequency of personalized and sometimes protracted power‐laden processes, which are likely to be especially difficult for single women (Khera and Nayak , 51–2).…”

“…Various accounts indicate reductions in malnutrition, in particularly intense and low‐waged forms of work, and in levels of migration and commuting, and outline significant gains for members of the scheduled castes, marginal farmers, women, widows and older people (Khera and Nayak , 52–3; NCEUS , 220; Drèze and Khera , 44; Khera and Nayak , 91–6; Pellissery and Jalan ; Gill et al , 479–93; Reddy 2013, 77, 148; Carswell and De Neve ; Jakimow , 264). Counter‐evidence emphasizes unevenness.…”

“…NREGS's impact on rural labour relations and labouring‐class conditions (as already indicated) is intricately linked with existing distributions of power and resources; with class, caste and gender dynamics; and with the extent and ease of access to non‐agricultural labour markets – whether villages are within commutable distance of urban labour markets (Heyer ; Carswell and De Neve ), have well‐established streams of circular migration (Rogaly et al ; Pattenden ) or are remote and agriculture‐dependent (Rawal ). NREGS's impact on labour's bargaining power may be restrained where dependence on agricultural labour remains high, and workers feel compelled to maintain ‘good relations for future employment’ (Jakimow , 273; see also Pellissery and Jalan , 288). At the same time it is in such places, where patterns of exploitation and domination are particularly skewed against classes of labour, that the potential gains for labour, and costs for farmers, may be greater.…”