Brentanian Inner Consciousness and the Infinite Regress Problem

Marchesi, Andrea

doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12261

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Apart from the fact that it presents the physical phenomenon of sound, the mental act of hearing becomes at the same time its own object and content, taken as a whole. (Brentano (1924-1928 As convincingly argued by Mark Textor (2006) 12 and more recently by Andrea Marchesi (2019), against Kriegel and before him Keith Hossack's "Identity Thesis" (Hossack, 2002), 13 Brentano explicitly denies that primary and secondary consciousness are identical. To support this view, as Brentano points out in opposition to Alexander Bain and John Stuart Mill, would inevitably lead to subjective idealism (Brentano, 1924-1928.…”

Section: Pre-reflective Self-awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness and Intentionality in Franz Brentano

Antonelli

2021

Acta Anal

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The paper argues against the growing tendency to interpret Brentano’s conception of inner consciousness in self-representational terms. This trend has received support from the tendency to see Brentano as a forerunner of contemporary same-order theories of consciousness and from the view that Brentano models intransitive consciousness on transitive consciousness, such that a mental state is conscious insofar as it is aware of itself as an object. However, this reading fails to take into account the Brentanian concept of object, which is ultimately derived from ancient and medieval philosophy, as well as the secondary, elusive character that Brentano attributes to inner perception. According to Brentano, we have an aspectual but transparent consciousness of transcendent objects, whereas our awareness of our own mental acts is always complete but incidental, and ultimately opaque. Reversing the relationship between intentionality and consciousness faces difficulties at the textual interpretative level, but also raises theoretical problems, for it risks treating Brentano’s theory of mind as a form of subjectivism and idealism.

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Section: Pre-reflective Self-awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness and Intentionality in Franz Brentano

Antonelli

2021

Acta Anal

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A Systematic Reconstruction of Brentano’s Theory of Consciousness

Marchesi

2021

Topoi

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In recent years, Brentano’s theory of consciousness has been systematically reassessed. The reconstruction that has received the most attention is the so-called identity reconstruction. It says that secondary consciousness and the mental phenomenon it is about are one and the same. Crucially, it has been claimed that this thesis is the only one which can make Brentano’s theory immune to what he considers the main threat to it, namely, the duplication of the primary object. In this paper, I argue that the identity reconstruction is untenable, and I defend an alternative, which I name the unity reconstruction. According to the unity reconstruction, secondary consciousness is a real part of the mental phenomenon it is about, and hence is distinct from it. I contend that this thesis does not in itself lead to the duplication of the primary object, and that what should be blamed is rather a controversial thesis about the intentional structure of secondary consciousness—a thesis which Brentano ultimately abandoned.

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