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AbstractWe investigate the role of corruption in the business environment in explaining the efficiency of withinsector production factor allocation across firms in nine Central and Eastern European countries in the period [2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012]. Using a conditional convergence model, we find evidence of a positive relationship between corruption growth and both labour and capital misallocation dynamics, once country framework conditions are controlled for: the link between corruption and input misallocation dynamics is larger the smaller the country, the lower the degree of political stability and of civil liberties, and the weaker the quality of its regulations. As input misallocation is one of the determinants of productivity growth, we further show that the relationship between changes in corruption and TFP growth is indeed negative. Our results hold when we tackle a possible omitted variable bias by instrumenting corruption with two instrumental variables (the percentage of women in Parliament and freedom of the press).Keywords: bribes, capital misallocation, labour misallocation, total factor productivity JEL codes: D24, D73, O47ECB Working Paper 1950, August 2016 1
Non-technical summaryIn this paper we investigate how changes in corruption in the business environment may affect total factor productivity (TFP) growth by influencing the efficiency of the allocation of both capital and labour across firms in nine Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in the period 2003-2012.The macroeconomic impact of corruption is well documented in the literature. Empirical studies show mixed results, supporting both the view that (i) corruption has the potential to foster economic development in that it constitutes the necessary "grease" to lubricate the stiff wheels of rigid government administration and legal framework, as well as the alternative view that (ii) the rent-seeking behaviour of corrupt officials might reduce economic performance, as promoted by the "sand-the-wheels" advocates.There is also a vast, yet inconclusive, literature on the possible impact of corruption on TFP via the input allocation channel. While some authors argue that corruption may promote allocative efficiency since only the most efficient and profitable firms can afford to pay bribes to obtain government services, others point out that corruption might promote sub-optimal choices with regard ...