Bribes, Lobbying and Development

Svensson, Jakob; Harstad, Bård

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1099326

Cited by 60 publications

(86 citation statements)

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“…The first possibility from Murphy et al () and Harstad and Svensson () recognizes that corruption is a form of rent seeking that is perhaps substitutable with other types such as lobbying. While corruption is often perceived as bribes to policy enforcers, lobbying is usually associated with political campaign activities that aim to influence policy makers (Campos and Giovannoni, ).…”

Section: Economic Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do the Effects of Corruption upon Growth Differ Between Democracies and Autocracies?

Assiotis

Sylwester

2014

Review Development Economics

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Many studies examining whether corruption lowers economic growth do not consider if the effects of corruption differ across countries. Whether corruption produces the same effects everywhere or whether its effects are conditional on some country characteristics are important questions. We investigate the association between corruption and growth, where the marginal impact of corruption is allowed to differ across democratic and nondemocratic regimes. Using cross-country, annual data from 1984 to 2007, we regress growth on corruption, democracy and their interaction. We find that decreases in corruption raise growth but more so in authoritarian regimes. Possible reasons are that in autocracies corruption causes more uncertainty, is of a more pernicious nature, or is less substitutable with other forms of rent seeking.

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Section: Economic Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do the Effects of Corruption upon Growth Differ Between Democracies and Autocracies?

Assiotis

Sylwester

2014

Review Development Economics

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“…8 8 Like Harstad and Svensson (2011), we assume that the penalty increases in k because the penalty for such a serious crime is larger. …”

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confidence: 99%

The Role of Monitoring of Corruption in a Simple Endogenous Growth Model

Coppier¹,

Costantini²,

Piga

2013

Economic Inquiry

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This article analyzes the relationship between economic growth and the monitoring of corruption. In our theoretical model, we derive a nonlinear relationship between the level of monitoring and economic growth, as well as between corruption and economic growth. At low monitoring levels, the economy experiences widespread corruption and medium growth rates, whereas no corruption occurs at intermediate monitoring levels, but low growth rates are recorded. At high monitoring levels, no corruption takes place and high growth rates are observed. The model is estimated using a dynamic panel data approach for Italy. Empirical results support the theoretical model. (JEL C33, D73, K42)

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“…In this paper, I argue that the price mechanism based on private ownership not only represents the incentives and answers to knowledge problems of economic calculation, but it also solves the problem of corruption. 2 2004, Brunetti and Weder 2003, Lambsdorff 2007, Harstad and Svensson 2011, Choi and Thum 2004 provides various microeconomic evidence of corruption. There is, however, only one theory, which explains the negative consequences of corruption for economic development.…”

Section: While Ludwig Von Mises Addresses the Question Of Entrepreneumentioning

confidence: 99%

“…From this point of view legal lobbying cannot be considered as corruption of any kind. Nevertheless, this conclusion was questioned Harstad and Svensson (2011) argue that bribery, unlike lobbying, leads to hold--up problems that discourage firms from socially productive investments. They argue that public lobbying affects all firms in an industry and tends to be more permanent so that the corrupt state officials cannot commit to not asking for bribes in the future.…”

Section: How To Avoid Corruption?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Mises, Hayek and Corruption

Otáhal

2013

J Bus Ethics

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Tomáš Otáhal: Mises, Hayek and CorruptionUsing the arguments of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayek, I argue that private ownership solves the economic problem of corruption. Since private ownership discourages entrepreneurs from rent--seeking, and privately owned media provide objective and unbiased information to citizens, any legal reform establishing and enforcement of private ownership also solves the corruption problem.

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Bribes, Lobbying and Development

Cited by 60 publications

References 0 publications

Do the Effects of Corruption upon Growth Differ Between Democracies and Autocracies?

Do the Effects of Corruption upon Growth Differ Between Democracies and Autocracies?

The Role of Monitoring of Corruption in a Simple Endogenous Growth Model

Mises, Hayek and Corruption

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