Although researchers have repeatedly shown that the meaning of the same concept can vary across different contexts, it has proven difficult to predict when people will assign which meaning to a concept, and which associations will be activated by a concept. Building on the affective theory of meaning (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) and the polarity correspondence principle (Proctor & Cho, 2006), we propose the dimension-specificity hypothesis with the aim to understand and predict the contextdependency of cross-modal associations. We present three sets of experiments in which we use the dimension-specificity hypothesis to predict the cross-modal associations that should emerge between aggression-related concepts and saturation and brightness. The dimension-specificity hypothesis predicts that cross-modal associations emerge depending upon which affective dimension of meaning (i.e., the evaluation, activity, or potency dimension) is most salient in a specific context. The salience of dimensions of meaning is assumed to depend upon the relative conceptual distances between bipolar opposed concept pairs (e.g., good vs. bad). The dimension-specificity hypothesis proposes that plus and minus polarities will be attributed to the bipolar concepts, and associations between concrete and affective abstract concepts that share plus or minus polarities will become activated. Our data support the emergence of dimensionspecific polarity attributions. We discuss the potential of dimension-specific polarity attributions to understand and predict how the context influences the emergence of cross-modal associations.Keywords: cross-modal associations; context-effects; affective dimensions of meaning; color; brightness "It is clear that everything on this planet is relative and has independent existence only insofar as it is distinguished in its relations to and from other things… since every conception is thus the twin of its opposite, how could it be thought of first, how could it be communicated to others who tried to think of it, except by being measured against its opposite?" Abel (as cited in Freud, Collected Papers, Strachey edn, IV, p. 187) Understanding how we give meaning to concepts lies at the core of being able to predict how people behave, think and feel. Studies in cognitive psychology, social cognition, and linguistics convincingly show that taskspecific contexts play a crucial role when constructing meaning and when engaging in conceptual thought (e.g.,