Britain and the Congo Crisis, 1960–63

James, Alan

doi:10.1007/978-1-349-24528-4

Cited by 27 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…They became dismayed with Hammarskjolds representative, Rajeshwar Dayal, and his proLumumba disposition, and successfully sought his removal for which Hammarskjold blamed a ruthless and unjustifiable cabale. 69 Of more significance was the British disquiet in September 1961 at the way Hammarskjolds representative in Katanga, Conor Cruise OBrien, appeared to be bent on ending the secession of the province by force and thereby intervening in the internal affairs of the state. 70 British concern over UN action reached levels such that Macmillan thought Hammarskjold would have to be brought up short and a .oreign Office Minister, Lord Lansdowne, was sent to meet him in Ndola near the Northern RhodesianCongloese border to seek clarification of the UNs goals and methods.…”

Section: British Reservations About Hammarskjolds Political Rolementioning

confidence: 98%

The British and the 1960 soviet attack on the office of united nations secretary-general

Johnson

2003

Diplomacy & Statecraft

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Section: British Reservations About Hammarskjolds Political Rolementioning

confidence: 98%

The British and the 1960 soviet attack on the office of united nations secretary-general

Johnson

2003

Diplomacy & Statecraft

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“…The central thesis of the case study approach, favoured by such scholars as Durch (ed.) (1993), (1997); James (1996);; Skogmo (1989); Weiss (1995); Wolfgang and Martin (eds) (1998) and recently influenced by the writings of Adebajo (2002); Chesterman (2002); Chopra (2002); Dallaire (2004); Ginnifer (2002); Goldstone (2004); Howard (2002); Ian and Mayer-Rieckh (2005); Rogie (2003); Suhrke (2001); Olonisakin (2008), Badmus (2015), (2017) is that because of its ad hoc nature in response to each problem, peacekeeping is best approached conceptually on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, the description and analysis of peace operations becomes the basic objectives and tasks associated with this approach.…”

Section: Peacekeeping Globalisation and Global Politics: Definitionamentioning

confidence: 99%

Basic Concepts and Theories in International Peacekeeping: An Analytic Review

Badmus

Jenkins

2019

Austral

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This paper reviewed some extense literature in peacekeeping. The review of the literature focused on two areas - concepts and theories of peacekeeping. After having discussed the three major approaches to think conceptually about peacekeeping in the literature, we argued that despite the existence of these multiple frameworks for addressing the conceptual problems of peacekeeping, they overlooked the imperative of the structures and processes of world politics, their impacts and how these have conditioned the roles of peacekeepers in it. Then, we examined four of the main theoretical approaches that are discernible in the peacekeeping literature, which offer possible frameworks for the analysis and interpretation of peacekeeping research. We argued that there is no single theory (or a metatheory) that fully explains the whole gamut of issues involved in peace operations. This is because these theoretical traditions provide different ways in which to comprehend peacekeeping. A single theory is highly unlikely to fully explain the complexities of contemporary peace operations, especially in a continent like Africa featuring different peacekeeping actors. Therefore, peacekeeping is best understood through the application of many theories in order to uncover the motives of peacekeeping authourising institutions, peacekeepers as well as the role(s) peacekeeping missions play and the interest they serve.

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“…As Alan James describes: 'an orderly, ideologically quiescent, and weakened country such as Britain was not inclined to wax enthusiastic over what could be interpreted as UN adventurism'. 32 This attitude was reflected by the Chief British Representative at the UN Sir Patrick Dean, who 'was convinced that the UN had done all it could in the Congo'. In the same vein, the head of the Foreign office African Department believed that 'the UN effort should end'.…”

Section: The Congo Crisis Eruptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He pressed that Britain believed the UN were exceeding their mandate and making it look like they would quash the breakaway province by force. 79 It fell to British Ambassador to the United States, David Ormsby Gore, to germinate these seeds of concession. Over dinner that night, Ormsby Gore, who was a close personal friend of the President, came up trumps.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

‘What an awful body the UN have become!!' Anglo-American–UN relations during the Congo crisis, February–December 1961

O’Malley

2016

Journal of Transatlantic Studies

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when Britain successfully appealed to the United States to intervene in order to stall UN actions in the Congo. The cooperation between President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to constrain UN Congo policy reflects the centrality of the organisation in Anglo-American relations at the time and also highlights an understudied aspect of the relationship between the London and Washington. It will be shown that the crisis put a strain on the Anglo-American relations, leading to efforts by the British to play on the Cold War fears of the Americans by urging them to limit the actions of the UN. It is argued that the changing nature of the organisation helped to foster tensions in the Anglo-American relationship, exposing inherent differences of opinion about how American Cold War objectives should be balanced against the British agenda for decolonisation. The two incidents highlighted here reflect how the crisis became a challenge for Anglo-American relations and ultimately reveal the waning influence of the United States and the UK within the UN at the time.Keywords: Anglo-American relations; United Nations; Congo crisis; Cold War; decolonisation When the crisis erupted in the Congo immediately following independence on 30 June 1960, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was initially insouciant. Despite his prophetic 'Winds of Change' speech delivered in Cape Town earlier that year, he did not immediately perceive the Congo crisis as a challenge to Anglo-American relations, nor a threat to his own government. He declared bombastically that 'MP's might froth over their club claret but they were not going to risk their seats and *Email: a.m.omalley@hum.leidenuniv.nl

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Britain and the Congo Crisis, 1960–63

Cited by 27 publications

References 0 publications

The British and the 1960 soviet attack on the office of united nations secretary-general

The British and the 1960 soviet attack on the office of united nations secretary-general

Basic Concepts and Theories in International Peacekeeping: An Analytic Review

‘What an awful body the UN have become!!' Anglo-American–UN relations during the Congo crisis, February–December 1961

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