This paper provides new estimates of the return on capital employed (ROCE) for major British railway companies. It shows that ROCE was generally below the cost of capital after the mid-1870s and fell till the turn of the century. Addressing cost inefficiency issues could have restored ROCE to an adequate level in the late 1890s but not in 1910. Declines in ROCE hit share prices and investors made little or no money in real terms after 1897. Optimal portfolio analysis shows that, whilst railway securities were attractive to investors before this date, they would have been justified in rushing to the exits thereafter.We are indebted to Michael Edelstein for providing us with his data set and to the staff of the British Transport Commission Record Offices in London, Edinburgh and York for their generous help. Tony Arnold, Richard Grossman and Tim Leunig made helpful comments on an earlier draft. Hyun J. Im and Tugrul Vehbi provided valuable research assistance. We have also benefited from suggestions by seminar participants at American University, Washington DC., University of Birmingham, University College Dublin and the LSE Cliometrics Study Group. The normal disclaimer applies.
2The profitability of British railway companies in the later-Victorian and Edwardian period has been much discussed over the years. Recent contributions to the literature have described rates of return as 'disappointing' and indicative of management failures.
1The data recorded in the Railway Returns show declining rates of return on capital employed from the early 1870s. However, writers who take a more sympathetic view of railway management and profitability have pointed to constraints on management from actual or threatened regulation and have argued that the raw data on returns to capital are somewhat misleading.2 Everyone agrees with Cain that there was 'waste and inefficiency' on the British railway system but when, how much, and how far it was management's fault has been obscure.3 Similarly, although it is generally recognized that, at some point, the declining profitability of Britain's railways had adverse consequences for those who held their assets, the implications have not been spelt out clearly. 4 Finally, recent work has pointed to a rapidly rising contribution made by railways to national income even though their private profits declined.
5All this means that answering the question 'how good was railway profitability?' has several dimensions. The most obvious of these is to establish the profitability record at the individual company level, i.e., to measure profitability as carefully as possible taking proper account of the difficulties of the sources, especially with regard to nominal additions to paid-up capital. Beyond this, railway companies' profitability has to be evaluated against a number of criteria. These include addressing the following issues. First, to what extent could better management have delivered higher profitability? Second, was private profitability good enough to keep investors happy? Third, ...