Brushing with Organized Crime and Democracy: The Art of Making Do in South Asia

Abstract

This article explores the performances of a particular category of young men often derogatively referred to as “chamchas” (sycophants) who are using the art of making do (jugaad) by exploiting and bluffing links with powerful political networks and political parties, as well as friendships with strongmen and their criminal crews. Crucially, the comparative ethnography across India (western Uttar Pradesh) and Bangladesh (Sylhet) introduces readers to the “contact zone” where legality, semi-legality, and organized criminal systems meet. In so doing, the article unravels the working of the democratically elected “Mafia Raj.”

‘That was a good move’—Some remarks on the (ir)relevance of ‘narratives of secularism’ in everyday politics in Bangladesh

“…Research on party politics has shown a lack of intra-party democracy (e.g., Jahan 2015), highlighting dynastic politics (Ruud and Islam 2016) as well as the entanglement of party political power and organised violence, particularly in the field of student politics (Andersen 2013; Kuttig 2019). The role of māstān, gunḍā , and other violent enforcers has received particular scrutiny, along with their relation to political power and (moral) orders (e.g., Hoque and Michelutti 2018; Ruud 2010; Suykens and Islam 2013).…”

“…Notably, in contrast to India or Pakistan where the strong relationship between caste-groupism, lineages, or 'ethnic groups', and party politics is well documented, parties in Bangladesh cannot appeal to lineages, 'tribes', castes, or linguistic identities to the same degree (cf. Hoque and Michelutti 2018), not only because of the country's different demographic features but also its policy and legislative decisions. 9 The emphasis on factionalism, patronage, and 'muscular politics' has led scholars to consider 'ideology' and personal convictions implicitly or explicitly as being insignificant.…”

Land, development and the political class: In a translocal ‘Londoni’ village

“…In this way, Tobias Berger's 'logic of non-enforcement' in legal disputes is upheld (this issue). Moreover, landlords are able to successfully harness villagers' sympathies and support by appealing to established perceptions of what constitutes a 'good' or 'moral' leader, through the hybridisation of traditional authority (Price and Ruud 2010), ocular displays of power and wealth (Michelutti et al 2019) and the ability to 'enforce' through the threat of violence (Hoque and Michelutti 2018). This curiously muddles the workings of the 'party-state' in my fieldwork context ('Introduction' to this issue), as allegiance to a political party is abrogated by patronage to Londoni landlords (regardless of the latter's partisan affiliations), since they possess the will for swift and direct provision of services.…”