Brute Force Governance: Public Approval Despite Policy Failure During the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Philippines

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed enormous governance deficits globally. Several populist strongmen practiced “medical populism” – ignoring scientific advice, proffering denials, and blaming others. More technocratic leaders recognised its severity, implementing strict lockdowns. But some failed to adopt more flexible restrictions once testing improved due to local enforcement difficulties, termed “blunt force regulation.” Although neither a pandemic denialist nor an obtuse technocrat, Philippine president Rodrigo R. Duterte's response combined aspects of both approaches with blame shifting and one-size-fits-all lockdowns while also securitising the crisis. Utilising methods developed during his bloody “war on drugs,” Duterte imposed a heavily militarised approach, scapegoated supposedly disobedient Filipinos ( pasaway) and bullied local politicians. While the Philippines has been among the worst pandemic performers globally, Duterte's approval ratings remained robust. It is argued “brute force governance” undermined the dynamics of accountability, enabling him to win public approval despite policy failure.

Policy implementation in crisis: Lessons from the Philippines

“…Engaging with a representative sample of the population using a mini-public allowed us to highlight where information deficiencies related to policies existed and how those policies actually affected people on the ground. This article complements research on the Philippines describing top-down 'brute force' policy implementation (Thompson, 2022) by illustrating how local-level political actors also possessed a significant degree of autonomy in enforcing measures and adapting restrictions to local conditions. Policy decisions related to the pandemic in the Philippines need to find a balance between the epidemiological and economic contexts (Vallejo Jr. and Ong, 2020), and these bottom-up accounts can provide additional information to make policy assessments.…”

Confronting the Philippines' war on drugs: A literature review

“…The impact of the WOD on the Philippine government's response to the COVID pandemic provides insight into the legacy or longer‐term consequences of the WOD as a mode of rule. Studies by Hapal (2021) and Thompson (2022a) show how the techniques of rule applied to governing drugs have travelled to the management of a public health emergency, and with what consequences. Like the WOD, the Philippine COVID response was characterised by securitisation in which the rule‐breaking behaviour of the poor was denounced as the problem and discipline was promoted as the solution.…”

“…A prominent feature of the literature on the WOD is the reference to populism, and in particular, penal populism (Curato, 2016, 2017; Johnson and Fernquest, 2018; Kenny & Holmes, 2020; McCoy, 2017; M. R. Thompson, 2022) and chauvinist populism (Parmanand, 2020). The penal populism thesis explains the popularity of the WOD in terms of politicians and rulers pursuing what they anticipate as a popular policy, regardless of its effectiveness (Johnson & Fernquest, 2018).…”

“…The premise is that a tough position against criminal and anti‐social activity reflected in policies that implement harsh punishment is popular, at least in certain societies (Johnson & Fernquest, 2018; in Kenny & Holmes, 2022). Penal populism is characteristic of corrupt governance that rejects liberal democracy (Iglesias, 2020; Pernia, 2019; Thompson, 2016; Untalan, 2016) in favour of brute force (M. Thompson, 2022a) and efficient justice (Gaspar, 2016). The securitization of drugs (Aculana et al., 2019; Apriellio, 2021; Utama, 2021) and the performance of crises (Lasco, 2020) through the manipulation of the media (Parmanand, 2023), coupled with attacks on institutions and mechanisms of accountability (Brooke et al., 2023), allow proponents of the WOD to justify punitive though ineffective policies and isolate critical voices (Iglesias, 2022; Johnson & Fernquest, 2018).…”

“…Among the social and collateral damages of the WOD (De Villa, 2022; Tugade, 2019) that scholars described was the resulting poverty and social stigma suffered by victims' families (Ofreneo et al., 2022; Pangilinan et al., 2020). Still other impacts include that on public health (Arquiza‐Legarde, 2023); COVID response (Hapal, 2021; M. Thompson, 2022); individuals' mental health (Treceñe et al., 2019; Yamada et al., 2023); human rights workers such as Amnesty International (Stansfield, 2017); climate change activists (Holden, 2023); international relations with China (Lopega, 2019); the burden to students of drug testing in schools (Lasco, 2023), and how the police used the WOD to harass sex workers (Parmanand, 2019). Generally, scholars agree that the impact of the WOD is catastrophic across various communities, except the drug trade itself.…”