Floor trading plays a pivotal role in the data trading market. Finding effective solutions to enhance the market share of floor trading is a pressing practical challenge. In this paper, data providers are innovatively taken as the main stakeholders, and parameters such as tax preference ratio and reward threshold are introduced to build a tripartite evolutionary game model of data providers, data trading platforms and government regulatory authorities, explore how participants make strategy choices in the process of increasing exchange trading shares, and analyze and verify the conclusions based on numerical simulation. The research results demonstrate that the evolutionary stabilization strategy is affected by multiple factors, including incentive coefficients, subsidy coefficients, penalty amounts, reward thresholds, incentive subsidy costs, value-added costs and tax incentives ratios. The government's appropriate adjustments to penalties, reward thresholds, and subsidy coefficients can facilitate the participation of suppliers in floor trading and influence the platform's choice of incentive strategy, but increasing the subsidy coefficients is not conducive to the fulfillment of the government's responsibility. Strengthened government supervision regarding the control of platform's value-added costs, higher tax incentives ratio, higher incentive coefficients and costs of incentive subsidy costs for platforms can all help to enhance the likelihood of suppliers' engagement in onplatform transactions. Based on the analysis of the effects of various factors, it provides policy suggestions for the government and platform enterprises to coordinate the regulation of the market, in order to increase the market share.INDEX TERMS Data trading, on-platform implementation, platform incentives, tripartite evolutionary game theory, simulation analysis.
