Budgetary Negotiations: How the Chilean Congress Overcomes its Constitutional Limitations

Araya, Ignacio Arana

doi:10.1080/13572334.2014.943491

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…In fact, Chilean presidents cannot unilaterally modify the status quo (Alemán and Navia, 2016). Recent studies find that the legislature has found additional ways to influence the lawmaking process (Arana Araya, 2015;Faúndez Caicedo et al, 2022). Using different methodologies and approaches, a few studies openly call into question the alleged existence of hyperpresidentialism in Chile (Martínez and Dockendorff, 2023;Mimica et al, 2023;Jaime-Godoy and Navia, 2023).…”

Section: Presidentialism and Legislative System In Chilementioning

confidence: 99%

Where did Hyper-Presidentialism Go? The Origin of Bills and Laws Passed in Chile, 1990–2022

Mimica,

Navia

2024

Journal of Politics in Latin America

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While the success of the president's legislative agenda is measured by examining the rate of passage of presidential bills (the batting average), the dominance of the president over the legislative process can be better understood by considering the share of presidential bills among bills introduced and laws enacted. Studies on the success of the president's agenda outnumber those on the dominance of the president, but the latter more directly address the debate on the proactive legislative powers of the executive. Reviewing the 13,358 bills introduced and the 2603 laws enacted in the eight legislative terms in Chile between 1990 and 2022, we associate the constitutional changes in 2005 and the electoral reform of 2015 with a decline in the legislative dominance of the president. There was a progressive decline in presidential dominance in legislative inputs and outputs long before the 2019 social upheaval weakened the Piñera government.

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Section: Presidentialism and Legislative System In Chilementioning

confidence: 99%

Where did Hyper-Presidentialism Go? The Origin of Bills and Laws Passed in Chile, 1990–2022

Mimica,

Navia

2024

Journal of Politics in Latin America

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“…Previous works have underlined the institutional design features conducive to executive-legislative bargaining and cooperation (Aninat et al 2006). In advancing their agendas, presidents have opted for cooperation and consensus building with the legislature more than confrontation (Siavelis 2002), especially on bills that require high voting thresholds (Aninat et al 2006), due to the informal structures of power in the lawmaking process (Arana Araya 2013;2015;Soto 2015b, 207).…”

Section: The Presidential Veto In Chilementioning

confidence: 99%

Partial Presidential Vetoes and Executive–Legislative Bargaining: Chile, 1990–2018

Belmar Soto,

Navia,

Osorio

2023

Lat Am Polit Soc

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Defined as a credible threat that strengthens the bargaining position of the executive, presidential vetoes, widely understudied, carry a stigma of confrontation between state powers. But under some institutional setups, partial vetoes can be an additional step in the executive–legislative bargaining process. After a discussion of whether partial vetoes are a proactive legislative tool or a bargaining tool to induce executive–legislative cooperation, we test four hypotheses using the 2,346 bills introduced in Chile between 1990 and 2018 that reached a vetoable stage. We identified 97 partial vetoes (4.2 percent) and one total veto. Presidents are more likely to veto bills with more complex legislative processes and when they have stronger support in at least one chamber, but more popular presidents do not veto more bills. As most presidential vetoes in Chile are partial, they are an additional executive–legislative bargaining step in the lawmaking process rather than evidence of hyperpresidentialism.

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“…The MPs also need the political will to use them. An example of this was seen in Chili where the legislature amended the annual budget proposals of the executive, using formal and informal tools (Arana Araya, 2015).…”

Section: National Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

We are not the president’s ‘yes’ men and women: how legislative budget scrutiny improved in Uganda

Loozekoot

2021

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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This paper seeks to identify the factors that explain how members of parliament improved budget scrutiny using unique empirical data collected in Uganda. Two instances are studied that mark the improvements. First, the 2001 Budget Act that established the Parliamentary Budget Committee with large competencies for African standards. Second, the change in the 2012 Health Budget, a rare instance when parliament made significant budget amendments. The analysis reveals that political entrepreneurs used a window of opportunity to build a coalition for change. The window of opportunity opened at an event organised by civil society. The process that followed improved legislative budget scrutiny in a country with strong executive systems and strong patronage. Two factors have proven influential that are understudied in the current literature, civil society and female members of parliament.

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Budgetary Negotiations: How the Chilean Congress Overcomes its Constitutional Limitations

Cited by 11 publications

References 12 publications

Where did Hyper-Presidentialism Go? The Origin of Bills and Laws Passed in Chile, 1990–2022

Where did Hyper-Presidentialism Go? The Origin of Bills and Laws Passed in Chile, 1990–2022

Partial Presidential Vetoes and Executive–Legislative Bargaining: Chile, 1990–2018

We are not the president’s ‘yes’ men and women: how legislative budget scrutiny improved in Uganda

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