2008
DOI: 10.1506/ap.7.2.4
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Building a Better Audit Profession: Align Incentives and Reduce Regulation

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
4
1

Citation Types

1
4
0

Year Published

2008
2008
2021
2021

Publication Types

Select...
4
1

Relationship

0
5

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 8 publications
(5 citation statements)
references
References 4 publications
1
4
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Turning to my three suggestions, Jamal (2008a) agrees with the first of my three observations that there are too many mandates and requirements made by regulators in both financial accounting and auditing. In response to my second suggestion, that the mandate of the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) be changed to ensuring that more random audits occur, from a tick-box mentality of detailed documentation, Jamal (2008a) finds it hard to believe that an auditor working for a regulatory agency would be able to determine if the same audit procedures were used this year as last year. I think the only problem might be convincing the regulator that this is not too simple a task for professional inspectors to do!…”
Section: Steven E Salterio Queen's Universitysupporting
confidence: 58%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…Turning to my three suggestions, Jamal (2008a) agrees with the first of my three observations that there are too many mandates and requirements made by regulators in both financial accounting and auditing. In response to my second suggestion, that the mandate of the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) be changed to ensuring that more random audits occur, from a tick-box mentality of detailed documentation, Jamal (2008a) finds it hard to believe that an auditor working for a regulatory agency would be able to determine if the same audit procedures were used this year as last year. I think the only problem might be convincing the regulator that this is not too simple a task for professional inspectors to do!…”
Section: Steven E Salterio Queen's Universitysupporting
confidence: 58%
“…Hence managers, at least for a while, did not know what the auditor was going to be auditing, and thus did not know where to hide a fraud if they were motivated to commit one (Gupta and Leech, 2006). Indeed, Jamal's (2008a) confusion proves my contention that this was a subtle point, but as the evidence I presented showed (Salterio, 2008), it was an important, unintended effect. Jamal (2008a) also had problems with my suggestion of mandating the CPAB to monitor the compensation systems of public accounting firms to ensure that audit partners are not given incentives that would reduce audit quality or otherwise compensate auditors for anything but high-quality audits.…”
Section: Steven E Salterio Queen's Universitymentioning
confidence: 88%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Inspections by the VACPA have been considered non‐punitive and have not deterred audit firms and auditors from violating auditing standards and rules (Ministry of Finance, ). Other jurisdictions that now have independent institutions that oversee financial auditing, such as the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) in Canada (Jamal, ), the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the United Kingdom (Kend et al ., ) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the United States (Bronson et al ., ), have also had issues related to the regulatory inspection processes. These institutions have affected the dynamics of power among the main players in the market for audit and assurance services.…”
Section: Contextual and Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%