Building Democratic Infrastructure: village electoral institutions

Do informal institutions, rules, and norms created and enforced by social groups promote good local governance in environments of weak democratic or bureaucratic institutions? This question is difficult to answer because of challenges in defining and measuring informal institutions and identifying their causal effects. In the article, we investigate the effect of lineage groups, one of the most important vehicles of informal institutions in rural China, on local public goods expenditure. Using a panel dataset of 220 Chinese villages from 1986 to 2005, we find that village leaders from the two largest family clans in a village increased local public investment considerably. This association is stronger when the clans appeared to be more cohesive. We also find that clans helped local leaders overcome the collective action problem of financing public goods, but there is little evidence suggesting that they held local leaders accountable.

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“… 11 Nominations open to all villagers are popularly known as haixuan in China. It was first adopted in Lishu, Jilin in 1986 (Tan 2009). …”

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confidence: 99%

Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Investment in Rural China

Yao

2015

Am Polit Sci Rev

196

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“…Reform of village electoral institutions should be given a priority in rural political development. Tan (2009) argues for the establishment of a national electoral commission assuming responsibility of implementing, supervising, and adjudicating village elections and initiating candidate-initiated and candidate-centered elections as well as altering campaigning and the "two majority" rule, proposing the synchronization of election dates since a fixed election date may attract more media coverage, and foster civic culture. Kevin J. O, Rongbin H (2009) suggests that a purely procedural definition of democracy is problematic for election procedures in rural China though it has improved greatly over the last 20 years, proposing that democratization depends on the power configuration in which elected bodies are embedded.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Empirical Study of Factors Influencing Election in the Rural Government in China---Case Studies of Four Villages in China

2017

International Journal of Political Science

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“…Village self-government is at cross-roads, just as the village election institution is [47]. Village elections have not produced effective governing institutions in vast villages.…”

Section: Proposing a Village Self-governance Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Village elections gave villagers a democratic venue for participation [21,71] and improved the electoral connectedness in villages [28]. Village electoral institution has been generally strengthened over the years in terms of electoral rules and procedures, although some vital aspects of institutional building are still very much desired to be completed [35,47].…”

Section: State Of Village Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Why Village Election Has Not Much Improved Village Governance

Tan

2010

J OF CHIN POLIT SCI

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Village elections have been implemented throughout China for more than a decade. Much improvement has been made in the institutionalization of village elections. However, village election is widely viewed as producing little effect on village governance. What has been perceived as electoral achievement has yet to be translated into improving the way villages are governed. Why has village election remained largely irrelevant to effective village self-government? This paper intends to answer the question by examining some causal factors responsible for ineffective village governance. Specifically, this paper looks at the dysfunctional village governance structure, township re-assertiveness over villages, and the village dualleadership factor. This paper proposes a new governing model that incorporates major village players to ensure that village elections will lead to effective village governance in the countryside.Democratic election is generally believed to be closely linked to responsive governance, although it does not necessarily have a causal-effect relationship. Much of it depends also on other institutional and cultural factors such as legal systems and civic culture. Village elections have been implemented throughout China for more than a decade. Much improvement has been made in the institutionalization of village elections. Village elections have now been conducted regularly every three years, and villagers' awareness of democratic rights and election rules have been enhanced with each round of village elections.However, village election is widely viewed as producing little effect on village governance. What has been perceived as electoral achievement has yet to be J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2010) 15:153-167

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Building Democratic Infrastructure: village electoral institutions

Cited by 12 publications

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Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Investment in Rural China

Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Investment in Rural China

An Empirical Study of Factors Influencing Election in the Rural Government in China---Case Studies of Four Villages in China

Why Village Election Has Not Much Improved Village Governance

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