2000
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.218928
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Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth

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Cited by 77 publications
(105 citation statements)
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References 13 publications
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“…As a result, the accumulation of human capital is affected adversely, and consequently, the rate of growth is lower (Murphy et al 1991;Pecorino 1992). For a given exogenously determined amount of rent in an economy, the growth reducing effect of corruption is larger in countries with a low level of human capital, typically low income countries (Ehrlich and Lui 1999).…”
Section: The Current Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…As a result, the accumulation of human capital is affected adversely, and consequently, the rate of growth is lower (Murphy et al 1991;Pecorino 1992). For a given exogenously determined amount of rent in an economy, the growth reducing effect of corruption is larger in countries with a low level of human capital, typically low income countries (Ehrlich and Lui 1999).…”
Section: The Current Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In concluding their study of corruption, Waller et al (2002) suggested that the best option for reducing bribery is increasing the salaries of civil servants. Other empirical research studies have indicated that countries that are mired in poverty are often inundated by corruption, while wealthier countries are less susceptible (Ehrlich and Lui, 1999).…”
Section: Government Shortcomingsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…More generally, our paper relates to the theoretical literature on the interrelations between rent seeking and corruption, on the one hand, and growth, on the other. Major contributions include Gelb, Knight, and Sabot (1991), Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishney (1991), Tornell and Velasco (1992), Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1994), Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), Ades and di Tella (1997), Bardhan (1997), Tornell (1997), Ehrlich and Lui (1999), Barreto (2000), Mauro (2004), and Ellis and Fender (2006). 2 These contributions, however, do not assess the effects of foreign aid or other windfall gains on rent seeking, corruption and growth.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%