Bureaucratic Politics and Administration in Chile

Cleaves, Peter S.

doi:10.1525/9780520317475

Cited by 50 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Argentina and Uruguay applied conservative economic policies, with austerity, but without privatizations and trade opening. At the beginning of Pinochet's administration, in September 1973, a moderate (conservative) political economy was launched by the economy minister Leniz, whose reforms were very gradual (Cleaves, 1974). There was austerity, but no relevant privatizations were decided: only of those enterprises being nationalized by Allende (Arriagada, 1988;Remmer, 1989).…”

Section: Liberal Political Economies: Pinochet In Chilementioning

confidence: 99%

Political economies and decision-making processes in Latin America

Fossati

2022

RELASP

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In this article, political economies have been linked to the decision-making processes of Latin American countries, before and after 1989. Conservative and liberal reforms have usually been applied through neo-oligarchic decision-making processes. Social-democrat economic policies have often been implemented with neo-corporatism. When “soft” populism prevailed, partitocrazia was the typical political instrument of lef tist governments, either if they governed or if they were at the opposition. Thus, they usual ly vetoed rightist presidents’ market reforms. The political consequence of “hard” populism has been authoritarianism, like in Venezuela with Chavez and Maduro. In “hybrid” economic policies, combining different models of political economies, there is not a stable decision-making process, and political conflict is usually strong.

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Section: Liberal Political Economies: Pinochet In Chilementioning

confidence: 99%

Political economies and decision-making processes in Latin America

Fossati

2022

RELASP

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“…There is also a diversity of behaviors between the employers and the target group. Therefore, i) the bigger the behavior diversity between the actors to be regulated, the harder it will be to formulate clear regulations, decreasing the probabilities to achieve the normative goals (Sabatier y Mazmanian, 2000); ii) the bigger the complexity of the change, in the way that things used to be, involves both technical and behavioral changes, so the harder it will be to implement the policies (Cleaves, 1974). So, the implementation as a space where the social policies are manifested is far from being a production factor, because it is not linear.…”

Section: The Implementation Is Not Reduced To a Production Factormentioning

confidence: 99%

Study of the Bonds Established at Social Programs Implementation in Cali, Colombia, Using the Contextual Interaction Theory

et al. 2022

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This study aims to research the contextual interaction processes set during the implementation of four social programs in Cali. The purpose of this is to identify the social bonds and the approaches to social programs that are configured at the implementation level between the different actors involved. The four programs to be analyzed were selected following a typology where they can be compared according to the degree of interaction and the homogeneity in the tasks involved. Therefore, the chosen programs were studied through 14 semi-directed interviews conducted with the stakeholders: public officials, community-based intermediaries, and beneficiaries. The main results highlight the challenge that the diversity of the communities set to the programs. These are all complex situations that question the totalizing role of the institution within the resolution of the community’s problems, and that open spaces to other approaches, such as the governance, where implementation interfaces located in the same communities of the intervention, on the edge of the limits of the State.

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“…A significant research tradition in Latin American political economy demonstrates that one often has to look within the bureaucracy-beyond presidential dynamics-for explanations of policy-making and implementation (Centeno 1994;Cleaves 1974;Lal and Maxfield 1992). Some scholars have argued that central bureaucrats of all stripes share a common fear of decentralization as a change that may erode their power relative to subnational officials (Manor 1999).…”

Section: Bureaucratic Dynamics and Re-centralizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Politics of Re-Centralization in Argentina And Brazil

Eaton

Dickovick

2004

Lat. American Res. Rev.

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In response to the growing salience of re-centralization in several Latin American countries that decentralized in the 1980s and 1990s, this paper examines presidential efforts to re-centralize fiscal power in the 1990s. In our study of re-centralization in Argentina and Brazil, we assess the utility of four common political economy explanations: the presence of economic crisis; the partisan powers of the president; the division of formal powers between the branches; and the extent of intra-bureaucratic conflict. We find that the success of economic stabilization measures facilitated re-centralization in both countries, though the pathways connecting the two phenomena were partially distinct. In Argentina, key re-centralization measures were rapidly achieved after stabilization as the result of the president's strong partisan powers and in the form of political deals within the Peronist party. Subsequently, the dissipation of President Carlos Menem's powers over the course of his second term facilitated the “return of the governors.” In Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso re-centralized despite weak partisan powers, largely by using his reputation as a successful stabilizer to build a broad reform coalition. In Cardoso's Brazil, strong partisan cohesion in important cabinet posts also served as a partial substitute for the lack of partisan power in the legislature. These findings suggest the need for a closer examination of re-centralization efforts, particularly in the wake of macroeconomic stabilization and economic reform.

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Bureaucratic Politics and Administration in Chile

Cited by 50 publications

References 0 publications

Political economies and decision-making processes in Latin America

Political economies and decision-making processes in Latin America

Study of the Bonds Established at Social Programs Implementation in Cali, Colombia, Using the Contextual Interaction Theory

The Politics of Re-Centralization in Argentina And Brazil

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