Business operations, contestability, bureaucratic holdup, and bribe solicitations

Abstract

The field of research on determinants of corruption has been quite active in recent years with the result that new investigations must strive harder to have either a novel empirical or a theoretical basis. A recent literature survey by Dimant and Tosato (2018) notes several new developments in the study

The nexus between public sector corruption and private sector efficiency: Evidence from worldwide firm‐level data

“…Nonetheless, unregistered firms are found to be less vulnerable to efficiency losses created by the administrative delays of regulatory authorities because their frequency of meeting with government officials is relatively lower. Moreover, Goel, Mazhar, and Saunoris (2020) confirm that, when performing regulatory and administrative activities with regard to business start‐up procedures, there are frequent bureaucratic holdups in countries; government bureaucrats take a longer time to give clearances. The same situation can be observed with regard to import licenses, but with lower intensity.…”

Identifying the corrupt cog in the wheel: Dimensions of supply chain logistics and cross‐country corruption

“…1 Some authors, for example, Ketchen and Hult (2007), argue that competition across supply chains might be a new competitive dimension for firms. A lack of supply chain reliability could also act as a barrier to entry of new firms (see Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) for a broader discussion; also see Dreher and Gassebner (2013), Goel (2012), Goel, Mazhar, and Saunoris (2020), ). While we do not have information on supply chain types per se, our consideration of specific logistics dimensions should capture some of the underlying distinctions.…”