Businessperson Deputies and Party Cohesion: Evidence from the Russian State Duma

Abstract

Previous explorations of Russia’s mixed electoral system uncovered conflicting results on party discipline in legislative voting. The effect in recent convocations is modest, with single-member district deputies expressing slightly less factional loyalty than those elected under proportional representation. However, factors other than electoral mandate may also affect party cohesion. In particular, a definitive connection exists between holding public office in Russia and the opportunity to maximize personal profit-seeking. Using individual-level reading voting data on budgetary bills from the 7th State Duma, I examine how the profit-seeking behavior of deputies who previously held business positions at the executive level influences party cohesion. I find significant evidence that deputies with previous executive business positions defect from their party more frequently than those without. The effect is marginally greater for deputies elected from single-member districts rather than the party-list. These findings have greater implications for party cohesion and the involvement of businesspeople in national legislatures.

Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

“…Interestingly, I also find no effect of business deputies defecting from the regime, a result that contrasts previous work by Dasanaike (2022). This could be explained by a difference in my sample, which covers three convocations and all votes, rather than only budget bills in a single convocation.…”

“…Attempts to weed out corruption may threaten a leader's support base as well as breathe new life into formerly compliant political institutions. Relatedly, it joins an emerging body of scholarship on how autocratic legislatures work (Gandhi, Noble, and Svolik 2020), in particular work showing how outside interests affect voting in the Russian Duma (Chaisty 2013;Dasanaike 2022). The results here echo previous work showing how transparency in authoritarian regimes can lead deputies to reduce their participation and become more vulnerable to punishment from above (Malesky, Schuler, and Tran 2012).…”

“…It is important to distinguish corrupt legislators from other legislators who directly represent special interests, such as corporations, while in office. In Russia, this latter group has received considerable scholarly attention; for example, Dasanaike (2022) and Noble (2020) show that deputies with business experience more often defect from their parties. Chaisty (2013) also finds deputies with ties to specific industries introduce more legislation related to these sectors that they might personally benefit from.…”