In this paper we provide a pricing-hedging duality for the model-independent superhedging price with respect to a prediction set Ξ ⊆ C[0, T ], where the superhedging property needs to hold pathwise, but only for paths lying in Ξ. For any Borel measurable claim ξ which is bounded from below, the superhedging price coincides with the supremum over all pricing functionals E Q [ξ] with respect to martingale measures Q concentrated on the prediction set Ξ. This allows to include beliefs in future paths of the price process expressed by the set Ξ, while eliminating all those which are seen as impossible. Moreover, we provide several examples to justify our setup. .sg. setting, superhedging is required to hold true for every possible future path in C[0, T ] of the price process. Such an approach has started with the seminal work [14] and has been recently lead to attention in various other works; we refer to [1,3,6,10], to name but a few.However, it turns out that the concept of superhedging is too robust leading to too high prices. In fact, for stochastic volatility or rough volatility models, it turns out that the classical superhedging price coincides with the model-independent one and is so high that for Markovian payoffs of the form Γ(S T ), like e.g. the European Call and Put option, the optimal superhedging strategy can be chosen to be of buy-and-hold type, see [9,23]. To reduce the model-independent superhedging price, inspired by the work of [22], [15] introduced the concept of prediction sets, where agents may allow to exclude paths which they consider to be impossible to model future price paths. Hence they require the superhedging property only to hold true on every path in Ξ ⊆ C[0, T ] of their prediction set.Whereas the pricing-hedging duality is well-understood for the pathwise superhedging with respect to all paths in C[0, T ], it turns out that the problem becomes considerably more difficult when requiring the superhedging property only to hold true on the prediction set Ξ ⊆ C[0, T ]. To illustrate the difficulty, consider the examples where the agent may believe in the Black-Scholes model, or is uncertain about the volatility like in the G-expectation (see [28]) and hence models his/her beliefs by requiring