Buyer and Nonprofit Levers to Improve Suppliers' Environmental Performance

Karaer, Özgen; Kraft, Tim; Khawam, John

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2575878

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 61 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This assumption is not unreasonable in practice: Although in their study of A + B auctions, Lewis and Bajari (2011) estimated the elasticity of supply for quality to be around 0.3 for California highway contractors, other markets have their own elasticities for different quality measures. In the product quality literature (e.g., Karaer, Kraft, & Khawam, 2017;Karmarkar & Pitbladdo, 1997), total cost is quadratic in quality (and therefore, yields a linear marginal cost), which is also consistent with the A + B bidding model presented by Zheng (2000).…”

Section: Auction Environmentsupporting

confidence: 82%

The role of transparency in procurement: Revealed versus concealed scoring rules in sealed bid A + B auctions

Quiroga

Moritz

Guide

2020

J of Ops Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We investigate the impact of using a clear scoring rule in a sealed bid multi‐dimensional (A+B) procurement auction, as frequently used in government procurement. The central procurement agency in Chile (ChileCompra) asked for help to understand how concealing the scoring rule affected buyers. Using an experiment, we analyze the effect of transparently communicating the scoring rule on bidding outcomes by comparing the buyer's surplus and supplier profits when buyers expressly communicate the weight they place on a nonmonetary (B) attribute, versus when this information is concealed from bidders. In addition, we compare outcomes where the scoring rule is made visible only after the offers are submitted. If the scoring rule is not disclosed, outcomes are poorer for buyers, and sellers see their profits increase.

show abstract

Section: Auction Environmentsupporting

confidence: 82%

The role of transparency in procurement: Revealed versus concealed scoring rules in sealed bid A + B auctions

Quiroga

Moritz

Guide

2020

J of Ops Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Finally, Karaer et al. () investigate when a buyer can use competition or cost sharing to improve a supplier's environmental performance. We depart from the previous literature in two fundamental aspects.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Guo et al (2015) show that greater downstream competition, a more concentrated supplier base, and a less flexible supply chain all make a firm more likely to source responsibly. Finally, Karaer et al (2015) investigate when a buyer can use competition or cost sharing to improve a supplier's environmental performance. We depart from the previous literature in two fundamental aspects.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Chain Structure Incentives for Corporate Social Responsibility: An Incomplete Contracting Analysis

Letizia

Hendrikse

2016

Production and Operations Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Downstream firms increasingly recognize the importance of integrating social and environmental concerns with their businesses. As a consequence, they urge to create incentives for their suppliers to invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Contracts to provide these incentives are rarely observed in practice. If not totally absent, contracts may be incomplete, in that unforeseen contingencies or some CSR attributes that are difficult to measure may not be included in the contract. We show that incentives for CSR investments can also be provided through the supply chain structure, which consists of the distribution of ownership rights over the firms' assets of production, and involves horizontal and/or vertical alliances among supply chain members. Motivated by examples in agricultural contexts, this study adopts the property rights approach to study the impact of supply chain structures on the adoption of CSR activities. We show that the structure that best incentivizes CSR investments depends on the interaction between CSR vertical synergy, free‐riding, and countervailing power. One of the main findings is that the alliance between suppliers is beneficial only if the revenues generated by a downstream investment are sufficiently high. In fact, only in this case, the suppliers can appropriate a sufficiently large stake of the revenues generated downstream, thanks to their countervailing power. When the upstream investment costs become high, however, the suppliers will invest in CSR only if the downstream distributor is vertically integrated. The resulting structure of a cooperative will best incentivize CSR investments only if the CSR vertical synergy between the two tiers of the supply chain is sufficiently high.

show abstract

Motivating Suppliers' Sustainability Performance via Investments in Pollution Abatement Innovations

Shi

Zhang

Hausman³

2016

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Buyer and Nonprofit Levers to Improve Suppliers' Environmental Performance

Cited by 3 publications

References 61 publications

The role of transparency in procurement: Revealed versus concealed scoring rules in sealed bid A + B auctions

The role of transparency in procurement: Revealed versus concealed scoring rules in sealed bid A + B auctions

Supply Chain Structure Incentives for Corporate Social Responsibility: An Incomplete Contracting Analysis

Motivating Suppliers' Sustainability Performance via Investments in Pollution Abatement Innovations

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About