Buying Amendments? Lobbyists' Campaign Contributions and Microlegislation in the Creation of the Affordable Care Act

Abstract

When do campaign contributions matter? This article advances the claim that a group that gives campaign contributions to US Members of Congress is more likely to achieve legislative success when (1) a single legislator can deliver to the group (2) a private benefit (3) without attracting negative attention. Using an original data set based on the written comments of nearly 900 interest groups lobbying the US Senate Finance Committee on health reform legislation in 2009, I link group requests to corresponding legislation. The analysis shows a significant relationship between lobby groups' campaign contributions and their legislative success, and at distinct units of analysis—the group, the side, and the group‐senator dyad. The relationship is particularly strong in predicting senators’ amendments in committee. The rare data presented here offer compelling evidence that interest groups' legislative victories are sometimes connected to campaign contributions in a way that previous studies could not identify.

The Foundations of Corporate Strategies Comment on "‘Part of the Solution’: Food Corporation Strategies for Regulatory Capture and Legitimacy"

“…11 It can substantially benefit corporate financial returns, reduce effective corporate tax rates, shape deregulation policies, influence restrictions against unionization, influence marketing regulations, and influence healthcare expenditures, policies, and laws. 23 , 24 …”

“…11 It can substantially benefit corporate financial returns, reduce effective corporate tax rates, shape deregulation policies, influence restrictions against unionization, influence marketing regulations, and influence healthcare expenditures, policies, and laws. 23,24 Election Campaign Donations The US political system is money-driven so candidates spend a large proportion of their time fund-raising. Elections are the one direct threat to industry power over government 10 so corporations and their wealthy officers and employees, and corporate earnings-derived charitable foundations 25 contribute billions of dollars 10 indirectly to individual candidate's election campaigns and political parties and their conventions, and directly to campaigns through political action committees (PACs), Super PACs, and certain types of nonprofit organizations that do not have to identify donors ("dark money").…”

Gift Travel in the U.S. House of Representatives

“…Other groups seek to change members' policy positions. Scholars have long argued that preference change, or even flat-out vote-buying, occurs when interest groups and legislators connect (Hall and Wayman 1990;Kalla and Broockman 2016;McKay 2018McKay , 2019Powell and Grimmer 2016;Stratmann 1991;Welch 1982;Wright 1990). Measuring position change and linking it to exogenous groups is a notably difficult task and one that many scholars have attempted (Baumgartner et al 2009;Fouirnaies 2017;Hall and Wayman 1990).…”

“…Despite this fascination, scholars have historically failed to find direct linkages between campaign contributions and roll-call votes (Welch 1982;Wright 1990). Scholars have, however, found interest groups influence members in other ways, such as contributions timed before key votes or committee markups (Hall and Wayman 1990;Stratmann 1998), the provision of information or labor to members' offices (Hall and Deardorff 2006), and even contributions in exchange for meetings with members or changes to legislative language (Kalla and Broockman 2016;Langbein 1986;McKay 2018McKay , 2019.…”

More than Mere Access: An Experiment on Moneyed Interests, Information Provision, and Legislative Action in Congress

“…It is well established that wealthy donors and large corporations gain more access to Congress than average citizens (Bauer, Sola Pool, and Dexter 1963;Hansen 1991;Langbein 1986;McKay 2018McKay , 2020. It is less clear how, or even if, such privileged access yields legislative action.…”