Buying Audiences

Muñoz, Paula

doi:10.1017/9781108525015

Cited by 32 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 182 publications

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“…The impact of political finance reform should also extend to non -elected officials such as bureaucrats and judges. Note that in many polities, public officials are appointed through patronage networks with the goal of enlisting them in electoral campaigns – to help get out the vote, to advertise the party's message, to distribute funds or to contribute part of their salary to the campaign (Auyero 2001; Casas-Zamora 2005; Muñoz 2014; Muñoz 2018). Where political finance reforms are in place, this sort of patronage system is likely to be disrupted.…”

Section: Political Finance and Political Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Political Finance Reforms Reduce Corruption?

Hummel

Gerring

Burt

2019

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Reformers claim that public subsidies and regulation of political finance reduce corruption in politics, while observers worry that they have no impact on corruption, or even increase it. Despite national-level debates and billions of dollars spent, few studies have tested this relationship. The authors argue that political finance reform mitigates corruption by reducing private money's importance in politics and increasing the sanctions for corrupt behavior. Elite interviews from Paraguay's political finance reform illustrate the argument and elaborate the theoretical mechanisms. The study evaluates the argument using an original dataset measuring political subsidies from 175 countries from 1900–2015, as well as disaggregated corruption measures from the Varieties of Democracy project. The findings support the thesis that political finance reform reduces corruption, even in countries where such reforms are unevenly implemented.

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Section: Political Finance and Political Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Political Finance Reforms Reduce Corruption?

Hummel

Gerring

Burt

2019

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Pork Belly Politics: The Moral and Instrumental Reasons Clients Donate to Patrons in a Rural Colombian Mayoral Election

Diamond

2021

Qual Sociol

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The Puzzle of Clientelism

Golden

Nazrullaeva²

2023

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This Element presents newly-collected cross-national data on reelection rates of lower house national legislators from almost 100 democracies around the world. Reelection rates are low/high in countries where clientelism and vote buying are high/low. Drawing on theory developed to study lobbying, the authors explain why politicians continue clientelist activities although they do not secure reelection. The Element also provides a thorough review of the last decade of literature on clientelism, which the authors define as discretionary resource distribution by political actors. The combination of novel empirical data and theoretically-grounded analysis provides a radically new perspective on clientelism. Finally, the Element suggests that clientelism evolves with economic development, assuming new forms in highly developed democracies but never entirely disappearing.

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Buying Audiences

Cited by 32 publications

References 182 publications

Do Political Finance Reforms Reduce Corruption?

Do Political Finance Reforms Reduce Corruption?

Pork Belly Politics: The Moral and Instrumental Reasons Clients Donate to Patrons in a Rural Colombian Mayoral Election

The Puzzle of Clientelism

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