On the symbiosis between model-theoretic and set-theoretic properties of large cardinals Bagaria, J.; Väänänen, J.A.
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Disclaimer/Complaints regulationsIf you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. A fundamental property of the universe of sets is reflection. Roughly speaking reflection means that every property that holds of the entire universe of sets is permitted already by a set-sized sub-universe. By qualifying what "property" means one can relate reflection closely to large cardinal properties [1]. In model theory the analogue of reflection is the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem which in its various variants says, roughly speaking, that if a sentence of a logic has a model then the sentence has a "small" (sub)model, e.g. a countable model.The purpose of this paper is to use symbiosis to relate set-theoretic reflection principles to model-theoretic Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems. Our special interest is in analogues of large cardinals. In [1] strong reflection principles are used to obtain large cardinal properties at supercompactness and above. Here we focus on smaller large cardinals.By a logic L * we mean any model-theoretically defined extension of first-order logic, such as infinitary logic L κ , a logic with generalised quantifiers L(Q) and second order logic L 2 . It is not important for the purpose of this paper to specify what exactly is the definition of a logic, but such a definition can be found e.g. in [2, Chapter II]. What is important is that for any φ ∈ L * there is a formula Φ(x, y) of ordinary first-order set theory such that for all models A of the vocabulary of φ we have:A |= φ ⇐⇒ Φ(A, φ).