Cache Attacks on Intel SGX

Götzfried, Johannes; Eckert, Moritz; Schinzel, Sebastian; Müller, Tilo

doi:10.1145/3065913.3065915

Cited by 300 publications

(238 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Another family supports broader range of tasks (such as custom computation tasks) [9] [10] [39] [40], but relies on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and Remote Attestation Protocols [41] [42] to verify that the computations are being run on a genuine platform and the results are correct. However, TEEs are not available on every platform, require users to trust hardware vendors and are susceptible to side channel attacks [43] [44]. In contrast, PoP does not make any assumptions on users hardware.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Proof-of-Prestige: A Useful Work Reward System for Unverifiable Tasks

Król

Sonnino

Al-Bassam

et al. 2019

2019 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)

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As cryptographic tokens and altcoins are increasingly being built to serve as utility tokens, the notion of useful work consensus protocols, as opposed to number-crunching PoW consensus, is becoming ever more important. In such contexts, users get rewards from the network after they have carried out some specific task useful for the network. While in some cases the proof of some utility or service can be proved, the majority of tasks are impossible to verify. In order to deal with such cases, we design "Proof-of-Prestige" (PoP)-a reward system that can run on top of Proof-of-Stake blockchains. PoP introduces "prestige" which is a volatile resource and, in contrast to coins, regenerates over time. Prestige can be gained by performing useful work, spent when benefiting from services and directly translates to users minting power. PoP is resistant against Sybil and Collude attacks and can be used to reward workers for completing unverifiable tasks, while keeping the system free for the endusers. We use two exemplar use-cases to showcase the usefulness of PoP and we build a simulator to assess the cryptoeconomic behaviour of the system in terms of prestige transfer between nodes.• Section III presents Proof-of-Prestige (PoP), a novel type

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Proof-of-Prestige: A Useful Work Reward System for Unverifiable Tasks

Król

Sonnino

Al-Bassam

et al. 2019

2019 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC)

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“…Various attacks on SGX have been made public. While some analyze the memory access pattern of the enclave to extract secrets [38], [39], others are able to reconstruct secrets via a caching side-channel [8], [15], [37].…”

Section: Implementation Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scanclave: Verifying Application Runtime Integrity in Untrusted Environments

Morbitzer

2019

2019 IEEE 28th International Conference on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WETICE)

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Data hosted in a cloud environment can be subject to attacks from a higher privileged adversary, such as a malicious or compromised cloud provider. To provide confidentiality and integrity even in the presence of such an adversary, a number of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have been developed. A TEE aims to protect data and code within its environment against high privileged adversaries, such as a malicious operating system or hypervisor.While mechanisms exist to attest a TEE's integrity at load time [3], there are no mechanisms to attest its integrity at runtime. Additionally, work also exists that discusses mechanisms to verify the runtime integrity of programs and system components. However, those verification mechanisms are themselves not protected against attacks from a high privileged adversary. It is therefore desirable to combine the protection mechanisms of TEEs with the ability of application runtime integrity verification.In this paper, we present Scanclave, a lightweight design which achieves three design goals: Trustworthiness of the verifier, a minimal trusted software stack and the possibility to access an application's memory from a TEE. Having achieved our goals, we are able to verify the runtime integrity of applications even in the presence of a high privileged adversary.We refrain from discussing which properties define the runtime integrity of an application, as different applications will require different verification methods. Instead, we show how Scanclave enables a remote verifier to determine the runtime integrity of an application. Afterwards, we perform a security analysis for the different steps of our design. Additionally, we discuss different enclave implementations that might be used for the implementation of Scanclave.

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“…In more recent work, Rong et al [18] presented an improved methodology to establish covert channels in systems with shared cache, called Cloud Covert Channel based on Memory Deduplication (CCCMD). These cache side and covert channels have been refined [11,16] or targeted to compromise special hardware like the Intel SGX [5]. Other security issues due to architectural characteristics have been shown by Evtyushkin et al [3].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

The security risks of power measurements in multicores

Miedl

Thiele

2018

Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing

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Two of the main goals of power management in modern multicore processors are reducing the average power dissipation and delivering the maximum performance up to the physical limits of the system, when demanded. To achieve these goals, hardware manufacturers and operating system providers include sophisticated power and performance management systems, which require detailed information about the current processor state. For example, Intel processors offer the possibility to measure the power dissipation of the processor. In this work, we are evaluating whether such power measurements can be used to establish a covert channel between two isolated applications on the same system; the power covert channel.We present a detailed theoretical and experimental evaluation of the power covert channel on two platforms based on Intel processors. Our theoretical analysis is based on detailed modelling and allows us to derive a channel capacity bound for each platform. Moreover, we conduct an extensive experimental study under controlled, yet realistic, conditions. Our study shows, that the platform dependent channel capacities are in the order of 2000 bps and that it is possible to achieve throughputs of up to 1000 bps with a bit error probability of less than 15%, using a simple implementation. This illustrates the potential of leaking sensitive information and breaking a systems security framework using a covert channel based on power measurements. CCS CONCEPTS• Security and privacy → Security in hardware; Operating systems security; KEYWORDS covert channel; power; capacity bound; empirical study ACM Reference Format:

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Cache Attacks on Intel SGX

Cited by 300 publications

References 6 publications

Proof-of-Prestige: A Useful Work Reward System for Unverifiable Tasks

Proof-of-Prestige: A Useful Work Reward System for Unverifiable Tasks

Scanclave: Verifying Application Runtime Integrity in Untrusted Environments

The security risks of power measurements in multicores

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