Caching games between Content Providers and Internet Service Providers

Abstract

We consider a scenario where an Internet Service Provider (ISP) serves users that choose digital content among M Content Providers (CP). In the status quo, these users pay both access fees to the ISP and content fees to each chosen CP; however, neither the ISP nor the CPs share their profit. We revisit this model by introducing a different business model where the ISP and the CP may have motivation to collaborate in the framework of caching. The key idea is that the ISP deploys a cache for a CP provided that they share both the deployment cost and the additional profit that arises due to caching. Under the prism of coalitional games, our contributions include the application of the Shapley value for a fair splitting of the profit, the stability analysis of the coalition and the derivation of closed-form formulas for the optimal caching policy.Our model captures not only the case of non-overlapping contents among the CPs, but also the more challenging case of overlapping contents; for the latter case, a non-cooperative game among the CPs is introduced and analyzed to capture the negative externality on the demand of a particular CP when caches for other CPs are deployed.

Optimal Cache Leasing from a Mobile Network Operator to a Content Provider

“…The partitioning of the caches remains under the control of the internet service provider, while the CPs are allowed to establish secure connections between caches and users. Another work on the topic by Douros et al is [6]. Paschos et al [15] discuss the roles of MNOs, CPs and users as well as practical aspects of wireless caching such as the compilation of popularity data and the limitations arising from transmission encryption.…”

“…A recently studied alternative is to equip wireless nodes with caches (see [2]- [6]). The main purpose of cache memory installation is to ease backhaul traffic and its processing at the data centers by handling content requests from intermediate caches placed at the edge or inside the core network.…”

Cache Subsidies for an Optimal Memory for Bandwidth Tradeoff in the Access Network

“…where x and y are subject to constraints (16) to (19). We propose a distributed solution for (DP) where each CP places content to maximize L for given values of β and σ while the O: sets τ = 1, LB = 0, UB = k l T k l b 0 , ǫ and γ. ANO a: chooses initial σ l (0) ≥ 0, β n (0) ≥ 0.…”

Edge Cache-Based ISP-CP Collaboration Scheme for Content Delivery Services

“…Based on extensive in-network caching ability of ICN, Arifuzzamanet al [13] use game theory to analyze the decision making problem of caching contents to realize monetary compensation and revenue sharing among network players. Douros et al [14] propose to deploy a cache in an ISP and make the ISP and CPs cooperate to share deployment cost and additional profit. Ndikumana et al [15], [16] propose a joint incentive policy and a price-based cache replacement scheme for paid content in named data networking, which can increase the ISP's and CPs' profits.…”