Cameroon's relations toward Nigeria: a foreign policy of pragmatism

Abstract

Existing literature argues that the tactics of Cameroon foreign policy have been conservative, weak and timid. This study refutes that perspective. Based on extensive and previously unused primary sources obtained from Cameroon's Ministry of External Relations and from the nation's archives in Buea and Yaoundé, this study argues that Cameroon's foreign policy was neither timid nor makeshift. Its strategy was one of pragmatism. By examining the nation's policy toward Nigeria in the reunification of Cameroon, the Nigerian civil war, the Bakassi Peninsula crisis and Boko Haram, the study maintains that, while the nation's policy was cautious, its leaders focused on the objectives and as a result scored major victories. The study concludes by suggesting that President Paul Biya invokes the same skills he used in foreign policy to address the ongoing Anglophone problem, a problem that threatens to unravel much of what the country has accomplished.

Towards Understanding the Cameroon-Nigeria and the Eswatini-South African Border Dispute through the Prism of the Principle of uti possidetis juris Customary International Law

“…They were not related to contestation of the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula. The skirmishes arose from the killing of five Nigerian soldiers in Cameroonian territorial waters during crossfire exchange (Amin 2020;Keke 2020;Ngalim 2016). Cameroonian and Nigerian security officials are notorious for harassing and extorting money from traders and smugglers.…”

“…Cameroon's President Ahidjo acted fast to mend fences with Nigeria because he feared the dispute could open doors for Anglophone separatists and that his political enemies could take advantage of the situation and swing into action to compromise his reign (Interview: Yaoundé-Cameroon, March/April 2020). Cameroon apologised and compensated families of the Nigerian victims of the skirmishes (Amin 2020;Keke 2020;Konings 2011) and peace returned, but not for too long.…”

“…Under President Paul Biya, Cameroon changed its policy of indifference towards Bakassi, as a result of altered economic circumstances. The discovery of potential oil reserves in commercial quantities in the waters surrounding the Peninsula made it a coveted territory (Amin 2020;Ngalim 2016). Biya made unprecedented and bold moves in the 1990s to claim Bakassi, which had been under Nigerian occupation, on the grounds that it was technically Cameroonian territory, according to colonial treaties.…”

Post Conflict Bakassi and Role of Cameroonian and Nigerian Military

“…For example, Cameroon under Presidents Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya used the military to suppress Union de Populations Camerounaise (UPC) and Anglophone Cameroon secessionist attempts (Amin, 2021). Nigeria, on its part, used the military to suppress Biafran secessionist attempts (Amin, 2020). In joint military cooperation, Cameroon and Nigeria used their military to fight against the Biafran movement in the late 60s (Torrent, 2012;Amin, 2020).…”

“…Nigeria, on its part, used the military to suppress Biafran secessionist attempts (Amin, 2020). In joint military cooperation, Cameroon and Nigeria used their military to fight against the Biafran movement in the late 60s (Torrent, 2012;Amin, 2020).…”