Scientific Metaphysics 2013
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696499.003.0004
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Can Metaphysics Be Naturalized? And If So, How?

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Cited by 10 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Unlike physicalism, naturalism is not a thesis but a loose collection of ontological and methodological commitments that might best be described as a cherished “coat of arms” portraying a scientist slaying a supernatural dragon. At the same time, here is Melnyk (2013) on the difference between philosophy today and 30 years ago:…”
Section: Sec 1 Naturalism and Neo-naturalismmentioning
confidence: 98%
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“…Unlike physicalism, naturalism is not a thesis but a loose collection of ontological and methodological commitments that might best be described as a cherished “coat of arms” portraying a scientist slaying a supernatural dragon. At the same time, here is Melnyk (2013) on the difference between philosophy today and 30 years ago:…”
Section: Sec 1 Naturalism and Neo-naturalismmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…In this paper I will try to construct a neo-naturalist theory of mind that combines PGS's continuity with, among other things, Ladyman and Ross's Principle of Naturalist Closure (PNC) (p. 10, 37), necessarily relating new useful metaphysical hypothesis to fundamental physics and demanding a maximal overlap of physics with metaphysics, and Melnyk's emphasis on establishing cross-theoretical a posteriori identities (Melnyk, 2013, p. 83). To that I will add (Humphreys, 2016b) Transformational Emergence to help naturalism balance the opposing demands of continuity and novelty while keeping an eye on the meta-problem of consciousness for empirical reasons.…”
Section: Sec 1 Naturalism and Neo-naturalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The need for diverse stances on data that fundamental physics treats as the same data arises, according to Ladyman and Ross, from the scale relativity of ontology, which in turn arises from the fact that stochastic processes typically give rise to emergent regularities only when systems become suffi ciently large and complex for incomplete informational redundancy to have statistically estimable effects. An especially controversial aspect of Ladyman and Ross's view of the scientifi c basis for sound metaphysics (Melnyk 2013 ) is that, according to them, unifi cation only constitutes metaphysics when one of the stances entering into the unifi cation is drawn from fundamental physics; unifi cations between special sciences are simply theoretical innovations in those special sciences. I will return to this issue later.…”
Section: Dennett and The Role Of Philosophymentioning
confidence: 99%