Can Militants Use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada

Jaeger, David A.; Klor, Esteban F.; Miaari, Sami H.; Paserman, M. Daniele

doi:10.1177/0022002713516843

Cited by 24 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…To date, the most convincing evidence of outbidding is associated with the micro-level study of the Second Intifada and competition within religious groups (Hamas and PIJ) and within secular groups (Fatah and PFLP) (Jaeger et al 2015). These authors present a multinomial logit choice model where Palestinians indicate their support among rival factions.…”

Section: Terrorist Recruitment and Group Organizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11

Gaibulloev

Sandler²

2019

Journal of Economic Literature

162

126

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This overview examines critically the post-9/11 empirical literature on terrorism. Major contributions by both economists and political scientists are included. We focus on five main themes: the changing nature of terrorism, the organization of terrorist groups, the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies, modern drivers or causes of terrorism, and the economic consequences of terrorism. In so doing, we investigate a host of questions that include: How do terrorist groups attract and retain members? What determines the survival of terrorist groups? Is poverty a root cause of terrorism? What counterterrorism measures work best? In the latter regard, we find that many counterterrorism policies have unintended negative consequences owing to attack transference and terrorist backlash. This suggests the need for novel policies such as service provision to counter some terrorist groups’ efforts to provide such services. Despite terrorists’ concerted efforts to damage targeted countries’ economies, the empirical literature shows that terrorism has had little or no effect on economic growth or GDP except in small terrorism-plagued countries. At the sectoral level, terrorism can adversely affect tourism and foreign direct investment, but these effects are rather transient and create transference of activities to other sectors, thus cushioning the consequences. (JEL F21, F52, H56, K42, Z31)

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Section: Terrorist Recruitment and Group Organizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is some evidence that violence increases support within Islamist or secular factions, so that outbidding is ideology specific. Unlike earlier outbidding articles, Jaeger et al (2015) provide an identification strategy using district dummies, time dummies, and district time-varying characteristics.…”

Section: Terrorist Recruitment and Group Organizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11

Gaibulloev

Sandler²

2019

Journal of Economic Literature

162

126

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“…For other empirical studies on the effects of terrorism and political violence on the political attitudes of the affected population, see Karol and Miguel (), Berrebi and Klor (), Gardeazabal (), Gould and Klor (), Montalvo (), Shayo and Zussman () and Jaeger et al . ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Jaeger et al (2012) also show that more critical events of the conflict, like the occurrence of the first Palestinian uprising or the signing of the Oslo accords, do have a long lasting effect on Palestinians political attitudes, an effect that remains substantial even over 20 years after the event. For other empirical studies on the effects of terrorism and political violence on the political attitudes of the affected population, see Karol and Miguel (2007), Berrebi and Klor (2008), Gardeazabal (2010), Gould and Klor (2010), Montalvo (2011), Shayo andZussman (2011) andJaeger et al (2015).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Long-run Effect of 9/11: Terrorism, Backlash, and the Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants in the West

Gould

Klor

2015

Econ J

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This paper investigates whether the 9/11 attacks affected the assimilation rate of Muslims in the United States. Terror attacks by Islamic groups are likely to induce a backlash against Muslims, thereby raising their costs of assimilation. We find that Muslim immigrants living in states with the sharpest increase in hate crimes also exhibit: (i) greater chances of marrying within their own ethnic group; (ii) higher fertility; (iii) lower female labour force participation; and (iv) lower English proficiency. These findings shed light on the increasing use of terror and concurrent rise in social tensions surrounding Muslim immigrants in the West.The terror attacks on the United States in 2001 impacted the world in many ways. The shock and the loss of life were the most acute and immediate effects. Soon after, the economy was affected by the damage, disruption of air travel, and increasing uncertainty in the security situation and world financial markets. Major military campaigns were subsequently launched in Afghanistan and Iraq, creating new tensions and alliances between countries. It is safe to say that the 9/11 attacks transformed the economic and diplomatic landscape on a global scale. In this paper, we examine how the 9/11 attacks affected the Muslim community within the United States.In particular, we investigate the general idea that terror attacks by radical Islamic groups are likely to induce a backlash against the Muslim community as a whole, raising their costs of assimilation. Evidence for a backlash after 9/11 is supported by the data on hate crimes against Muslims, which went from 28 to 481 reported incidents from the year 2000 to 2001. A similar backlash against Muslims took place all across Europe (Åslund and Rooth, 2005;Hanes and Machin, 2012;Schüller, 2012). We empirically examine whether this backlash slowed the rate of assimilation by exploiting variation across states in the number of hate crimes against Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Using individual-level data from the Census and American Community Surveys from 1990-2010, our results show that Muslim immigrants living in states which experienced the sharpest increase in hate crimes after 9/11 also exhibit: (i) greater chances of "intra-marriage" (marrying someone who also originates from a Muslim country); (ii) higher fertility; (iii) lower female labour force participation; and (iv) lower English proficiency.Interestingly, the higher rate of intra-marriage is coming at the expense of marrying outside of the ethnic group, rather than a general increase in the marriage rate. All of these patterns are consistent with a less-assimilated outcome, since Muslim countries are characterized by very low Accepted ArticleThis article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. rates of female labour force participation and high fertility rates compared to natives in the United States.Overall, our findings show that the 9/11 attacks induced a backlash which made the Muslim community in America more cohesive and traditional. In order to att...

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“…Notably, Bloom (2004) proposed that Palestinians' public support for suicide terrorism increased following a growing number of suicide attacks after the Oslo process had failed in 2000. Different factions, such as Hamas and Fatah, were thought to outbid each other with attacks to compete over public support; suicide attacks by specific factions thus should have increased the level of support for the respective group (Jaeger, Klor, Miaari, & Paserman, 2010). Byrm and Araj (2008) failed to provide evidence for this hypothesis in a reanalysis of Bloom's (2004) data.…”

Section: Changes In Public Support For Terrorism Over Timementioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing Public Support for Terrorism Over Time

Schumann¹,

Rottweiler²,

Gill³

2020

Preprint

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Public support for terrorism reflects people’s sympathy for terrorist groups or tactics; it is influenced by and, in turn, shapes terrorists’ campaigns as well as counter-terrorism measures. To date, long term trends of public opinion about terrorism have been assessed in case studies and through descriptive statistics. Systematic analyses that specify whether and how public support for terrorism has changed over time are not available. We addressed this gap in the literature and conducted time-series analyses of eight waves of data (2004 2011) from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey. Including responses from 15 Muslim majority countries (N =43255), we showed that the percentage of people who believed that suicide terrorism was justified decreased between 2005 and 2007 after which support remained at a lower level (one structural breakpoint). Results also highlighted that depending on how public opinion was operationalised, the same data could inform an opposing narrative about support for terrorism. Notably when analyses were replicated with a mean composite score of the answer options ‘often', 'sometimes‘ and ‘rarely justified’ the percentage of people who thought that terrorism was ‘ever justified’ was reduced in 2005 before increasing again in 2008 (two structural breakpoints). Pre-registration of studies is therefore crucial to avoid selective analyses.

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Can Militants Use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada

Cited by 24 publications

References 25 publications

What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11

What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11

The Long-run Effect of 9/11: Terrorism, Backlash, and the Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants in the West

Assessing Public Support for Terrorism Over Time

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