Can Militants Use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada

Paserman, M. Daniele; Klor, Esteban F.; Miaari, Sami H.

doi:10.3386/w16475

Cited by 13 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…For other empirical studies on the effects of terrorism and political violence on the political attitudes of the affected population, see Karol and Miguel (), Berrebi and Klor (), Gardeazabal (), Gould and Klor (), Montalvo (), Shayo and Zussman () and Jaeger et al . ().…”

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confidence: 97%

The Long-run Effect of 9/11: Terrorism, Backlash, and the Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants in the West

Gould

Klor

2015

Econ J

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This paper investigates whether the 9/11 attacks affected the assimilation rate of Muslims in the United States. Terror attacks by Islamic groups are likely to induce a backlash against Muslims, thereby raising their costs of assimilation. We find that Muslim immigrants living in states with the sharpest increase in hate crimes also exhibit: (i) greater chances of marrying within their own ethnic group; (ii) higher fertility; (iii) lower female labour force participation; and (iv) lower English proficiency. These findings shed light on the increasing use of terror and concurrent rise in social tensions surrounding Muslim immigrants in the West.The terror attacks on the United States in 2001 impacted the world in many ways. The shock and the loss of life were the most acute and immediate effects. Soon after, the economy was affected by the damage, disruption of air travel, and increasing uncertainty in the security situation and world financial markets. Major military campaigns were subsequently launched in Afghanistan and Iraq, creating new tensions and alliances between countries. It is safe to say that the 9/11 attacks transformed the economic and diplomatic landscape on a global scale. In this paper, we examine how the 9/11 attacks affected the Muslim community within the United States.In particular, we investigate the general idea that terror attacks by radical Islamic groups are likely to induce a backlash against the Muslim community as a whole, raising their costs of assimilation. Evidence for a backlash after 9/11 is supported by the data on hate crimes against Muslims, which went from 28 to 481 reported incidents from the year 2000 to 2001. A similar backlash against Muslims took place all across Europe (Åslund and Rooth, 2005;Hanes and Machin, 2012;Schüller, 2012). We empirically examine whether this backlash slowed the rate of assimilation by exploiting variation across states in the number of hate crimes against Muslims in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Using individual-level data from the Census and American Community Surveys from 1990-2010, our results show that Muslim immigrants living in states which experienced the sharpest increase in hate crimes after 9/11 also exhibit: (i) greater chances of "intra-marriage" (marrying someone who also originates from a Muslim country); (ii) higher fertility; (iii) lower female labour force participation; and (iv) lower English proficiency.Interestingly, the higher rate of intra-marriage is coming at the expense of marrying outside of the ethnic group, rather than a general increase in the marriage rate. All of these patterns are consistent with a less-assimilated outcome, since Muslim countries are characterized by very low Accepted ArticleThis article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. rates of female labour force participation and high fertility rates compared to natives in the United States.Overall, our findings show that the 9/11 attacks induced a backlash which made the Muslim community in America more cohesive and traditional. In order to att...

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confidence: 97%

The Long-run Effect of 9/11: Terrorism, Backlash, and the Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants in the West

Gould

Klor

2015

Econ J

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“…Hence, their findings suggest that terrorism may be increasing over time and spreading to other regions, precisely because it appears to be a successful strategy to achieve political goals. In addition, focusing directly on the political preferences of the Palestinian population, Jaeger et al (2010) find some support for the "outbidding" hypothesis, the notion that Palestinian factions use violence to gain prestige and influence public opinion within the community. That is, the two leading Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, gain in popularity following successful attacks against Israeli targets.…”

Section: Political Effectiveness Of Terror Campaignsmentioning

confidence: 92%

Political Economy Studies on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Introduction

Caruso

Klor

2012

Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy

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“…As groups face greater competition for media attention and access to resources, they increase the frequency (Boyle 2009; Nemeth 2014) or intensity of violence (Conrad and Greene 2015). Some works see violent outbidding as a natural extension of ideological extremism (Jaeger et al 2015; Nemeth 2014). Groups will engage in extremism in order to publicly differentiate their “brand” (Conrad and Greene 2015, 546), thereby gaining greater access to ideologically motivated recruits, resources, and third-party support (Walter 2014; Polo and Gleditsch 2016).…”

Section: Consequences Of Rebel Rivalry: Feeling the Strainmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our paper takes this literature forward by emphasizing alternative strategies such as branding and carving out niches through ideology and demand differentiation and polarization. While some other works recognize the diversity of ideology (Jaeger et al 2015; Nemeth 2014) and demands (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012) among competing groups, they are generally assumed to be fixed. Using a dynamic and novel ideology and demands data, we demonstrate that competition forces some groups to outbid others by adopting different ideologies and demands.…”

Section: Consequences Of Rebel Rivalry: Feeling the Strainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rebel Rivalry and the Strategic Nature of Rebel Group Ideology and Demands

Tokdemir

Sedashov

Ogutcu-Fu

et al. 2020

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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How does the presence of multiple combatants affect rebel groups’ ideological and demand positioning? Although violent forms of inter-group conflict have been widely studied in the civil war literature, rebel groups’ strategic use of ideology and demands has received scarce scholarly attention. We argue that the pressure of competition forces rebel groups to differentiate themselves ideologically and demand-wise from their rivals to maximize their chances of survival and success. Rebel groups strive to set themselves apart by offering unique products to their supporters and recruits. Thus, we contend that rebel groups are more likely to modify their ideologies and demands from the government in the face of competition from rival groups. We test this theory using novel data collected from rebel group manifestos and public statements. Our findings suggest that groups are more likely to shift their ideology and modify their demands as the number of rival groups increases.

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Can Militants Use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from the Second Intifada

Cited by 13 publications

References 6 publications

The Long-run Effect of 9/11: Terrorism, Backlash, and the Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants in the West

The Long-run Effect of 9/11: Terrorism, Backlash, and the Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants in the West

Political Economy Studies on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Introduction

Rebel Rivalry and the Strategic Nature of Rebel Group Ideology and Demands

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