Can Money Symbolize Acknowledgment? How Victims’ Relatives Perceive Monetary Awards for Their Emotional Harm

Abstract

Legal systems differ markedly on how they treat the emotional harm suffered by close family members of crime or accident victims. This paper reports the results of two empirical studies examining how citizens whose child, partner, or parent was killed or seriously injured as a result of violent crime or tort (secondary victims) perceive a monetary award for their own non-economic harm relating to the death or injury of their loved one. The objective of our research was to test the Dutch legislator’s assumption that a (modest) monetary award for secondary victims’ emotional harm can have a meaningful symbolic value by providing recognition and satisfaction. Until then, no compensation was available for such harm under Dutch law. In addition, we examined whether victims’ relatives preferred standardization or individuation in determining the amount of the award, how they evaluated the amount, and the manner in which such awards might be offered. In a first quantitative survey study conducted in the Netherlands, 726 secondary victims were asked for their evaluations of such awards for the emotional harm they suffered as a result of the death or injury of their family member. We also asked our representative sample about their actual experience of the legal process in order to put their evaluations of such awards into context. In a second qualitative study, conducted in Belgium, interviews were held with 14 secondary victims who had actually received an award for their own emotional harm under Belgian law (study 2). Results suggest that secondary victims regard an award for emotional harm as a positive gesture and may interpret it as helping to satisfy relatives’ psychological concerns by seeing it, for example, as an acknowledgment of loss and responsibility. Overall findings suggest that victims’ relatives may be seeking acknowledgement of their emotional losses and the norm violation.

Rethinking Apology in Tort Litigation Deficiencies in Comprehensiveness Undermine Remedial Effectiveness

“…Such observations mirror insights from psychology, which demonstrate that victims' needs following transgressions extend beyond distributive concerns to include relational needs for fair treatment, recognition, and respect (Okimoto and Tyler, 2007). But while such needs may be prominent in response to torts, they may not be restored as effectively by the monetary remedies of tort litigation, which are limited in their capacity for conveying relational meaning (Abel, 2006;Hulst and Akkermans, 2011;Okimoto and Tyler, 2007). It is in this function that legal perspectives advocate apologies: apologies may convey remorse (e. g. "I am sorry"), acceptance of responsibility (e. g. "it was my fault"), acknowledgement of the victim's harm (e. g. "I know that I hurt you"), and sympathy (e. g. "you must feel terrible), which directly address needs relating to blame and recognition.…”

Beyond compensation? Examining the role of apologies in the restoration of victims’ needs in simulated tort cases.

“…“treats you with kindness and consideration,” “treats you with respect and dignity,” “deals with you in an honest and truthful manner” (Niehoff & Moormann, 1993), “shows concern for your rights” (Okimoto & Tyler, 2007), and “treats you in a polite manner” (Colquitt, 2001). We supplemented them with four items on victims’ emotional recovery, derived from an inventory on affectionate damages (Hulst & Akkermans, 2011): “approaches you in a sincere and open way,” “expresses empathy,” “sufficiently acknowledges the emotional impact on you,” and “responds swiftly to the incident” (1 = not at all , 7 = very much ).…”

“…While tort law may seek to express such relational sentiments by means of monetary compensation (e.g., punitive damages, see Hensler, 2003; affectionate damages [for noneconomic harm relating to injury/death of a loved one], see Hulst & Akkermans, 2011; pain and suffering damages, Radin, 1993), monetary remedies cannot directly express such sentiments: indeed, using money in this fashion may be ineffective, or even objectionable (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). Accordingly, legal perspectives increasingly recognize that monetary compensation may insufficiently restore victims’ nonmaterial needs, and that this may undermine the resolution of their disputes—particularly in case of nonpecuniary loss, like personal injury, where they assume such needs to be especially prominent and influential (Abel, 2006; Cohen, 1999; Shuman, 1994).…”

Dignity Takings, Dignity Restoration: A Tort Law Perspective

“…However, participants in the program reported that the monetary compensation "made them feel recognized and supported in the loss they had personally suffered and that this had helped them to come to terms with their loss." 40 If the process of compensation allows participants a voice, and treats them with respect, third party compensation can be effective in dignity restoration, as Atuahene found in the property context.…”