Can privatization be a catalyst for environmental R&amp;D and result in a cleaner environment?

Tsai, Tsung Hsiu; Wang, Chia-Chi; Chiou, Jiunn Rong

doi:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2015.10.002

Cited by 41 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…It is worth noting that these results do not depend on how much the public firm cares about environment (see Figures and ). Obviously, if the environmental tax rate is high, privatization catalyzes both public and private firms' ER&D simultaneously, in contrast to the result obtained by Tsai et al (), who thought that privatization cannot increase both public and private firms' ER&D simultaneously.…”

Section: Comparisonscontrasting

confidence: 66%

“…It follows that the private firm reduces its output due to the strategic substitution. Thus, the Firm 1's ER&D has a negative strategic effect in the mixed duopoly (Tsai et al, ). After privatization, the Firm 1's ER&D can only reduce its environmental tax, but does not affect the firms' output.…”

Section: Comparisonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If k = 1, the public firm extremely cares for environment and pursues the social welfare maximization. This situation corresponds to the standard case in which the public firm shares the same objectives as the government (Pal & Saha, 2015;Tsai et al, 2016;Xing et al, 2019). However, if 0 < k < 1, the public firm is concerned about environment, but less concerned about it than the government.…”

Section: The Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unlike this study, Tsai et al () mainly considered the clear production technology. Note that they also did not take into account the environmental attitudes of the public firm.…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

“…19 This is because the total output decreases with the environmental tax rate in the private duopoly (see (21)). 20 Unlike this study, Tsai et al (2016) mainly considered the clear production technology. Note that they also did not take into account the environmental attitudes of the public firm.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Environmental R&D and privatization in a mixed duopoly market

et al. 2019

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The study examines strategic environmental research and development (ER&D) under environmental tax in a mixed duopoly and further analyzes the impact of privatization on it. We show that the environmental tax may not necessarily promote the private (or public) firm's ER&D, and the relative ER&D performance between firms depends on the public firm's environmental attitudes and the tax rate. When the public firm cares much for environment, it can be used as an instrument to correct the private firm's underinvestment (or overinvestment) in ER&D. Moreover, privatization can (cannot) raise both firms' ER&D simultaneously if the tax rate is high (low).

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Section: Comparisonscontrasting

confidence: 66%

Section: Comparisonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unlike this study, Tsai et al () mainly considered the clear production technology. Note that they also did not take into account the environmental attitudes of the public firm.…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Environmental R&D and privatization in a mixed duopoly market

et al. 2019

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Non‐cooperative and cooperative environmental corporate social responsibility with emission taxes

Lee

2022

Manage Decis Econ

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This study examines emission taxes and environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) under cooperative and non‐cooperative regimes, respectively, and compares Cournot and Bertrand competitions. We show that (i) there exists substitutability between emission taxes and ECSR, while the cooperative case always yields lower emission taxes and higher ECSR; (ii) environmental damage and social welfare are independent of types of ECSR under Cournot, but both are higher in the cooperative ECSR under Bertrand; and (iii) the cooperative ECSR cannot achieve socially desirable outcomes, whereas the non‐cooperative ECSR is beneficial to society under low marginal damage.

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Non‐cooperative and cooperative environmental R&D under environmental corporate social responsibility with green managerial coordination

Xing

Lee

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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We consider a polluting Cournot duopoly within a managerial delegation framework and examine conflicting environmental concerns in which the owners pursue strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) while the managers undertake diverged environmental research and development (ER&D) investment. We investigate the effects of cooperation in both ECSR and ER&D on a firm's profitability and social welfare and find that managerial coordination has a critical effect on industry emissions, profits, and welfare. In the context of an optimal emissions tax, we show that managerial coordination failure might not occur, but it reduces welfare if the environmental damage is relatively high. We conclude that a pro-environmental government should encourage cooperative ER&D, especially when owners adopt cooperative ECSR.

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Can privatization be a catalyst for environmental R&D and result in a cleaner environment?

Cited by 41 publications

References 14 publications

Environmental R&D and privatization in a mixed duopoly market

Environmental R&D and privatization in a mixed duopoly market

Non‐cooperative and cooperative environmental corporate social responsibility with emission taxes

Non‐cooperative and cooperative environmental R&D under environmental corporate social responsibility with green managerial coordination

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