Can Quotas Increase the Supply of Candidates for Higher-Level Positions? Evidence from Local Government in India

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.A common argument for quota policies is that they can increase the participation of targeted groups in positions that are not directly subjected to quotas or after quotas are no longer in place. I investigate this hypothesis empirically in the context of India, where one third of local political leadership seats are randomly assigned to be held by a woman in each election cycle. Quotas increase the number of female candidates who later contest seats in state and national legislatures, where such policies do not exist. This effect arises from the candidacy of beneficiaries who gained experience in local government due to the quotas and career politicians who continue contesting in longer-exposed areas. Effect magnitudes imply that the policy accounts for a substantial portion of the increase in female candidates for these bodies since the start of the policy. The new candidates have a higher probability of a top finish when they run on major party tickets or contest in areas where the local constituency overlaps closely with that of the contested seat. JEL Classification:J15, J45 two anonymous reviewers, and seminar participants at provided excellent research assistance. Views and conclusions expressed herein are my own.

A Moveable Benefit? Spillover Effects of Quotas on Women’s Numerical Representation

“…Our findings contrast somewhat with existing studies that show no spillover effect of women’s reservations to neighboring geographic areas (Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras and Iyer 2018), or that the quota effect may actually limit the upward mobility of women (Kerevel 2019; Lassébie 2020). However, our results are consistent with studies that show that quotas induce an “acceleration effect” in widening the viable pool of women candidates (O’brien and Rickne 2016), the likelihood of women being re-elected increases even in the absence of quotas (Bhavnani 2009; O’Connell 2020), and that voter acceptance improves towards women politicians (Beaman et al 2009).…”

“…First, this paper adds to the small but growing literature on how institutional changes at one level of government can have ripple effects at other levels. Our research compliments the findings of O’Connell (2020) and Karekurve-Ramachandra (2020). O’Connell (2020) investigates the exposure effect of women’s leadership at the district level in 10 Indian states due to the 33% reservation until 2007, examining women’s representation at both the state and parliamentary levels.…”

“…Our research compliments the findings of O’Connell (2020) and Karekurve-Ramachandra (2020). O’Connell (2020) investigates the exposure effect of women’s leadership at the district level in 10 Indian states due to the 33% reservation until 2007, examining women’s representation at both the state and parliamentary levels. We extend this by taking into consideration the subsequent proportional shift in the gender quota levels from 33% to 50% on a larger spatial and temporal scale.…”

“…Such a theoretical process is outlined in Figure 1. Nor are we the first to examine how gender quotas at one level of government can affect representation at other levels, although the amount of current research on this is remarkably small (c.f., Bharadwaj 2021; Karekurve-Ramachandra 2020; O’Connell 2020). However, by combining supply- and demand-side arguments into multiple, testable measures, and through our empirical strategy outlined below, we offer a more comprehensive examination into how quotas can have effects on other electoral levels than do previous studies.…”

“…Such increases have, in turn, led to certain changes in women’s substantive representation, such as budgetary or legislative behavior (Bolzendahl 2011; Clayton and Zetterberg 2018; Funk and Philips 2019; Schwindt-Bayer 2010), and trust in government (Hinojosa, Fridkin and Kittilson 2017). Research also shows that gender quotas and women’s representation in politics have spatially (Chen 2010; O’Connell 2020) and temporally (Bhavnani 2009) spilled over to other countries (Tripp and Kang 2008), political parties (Cowell-Meyers 2011), and institutions (Thames and Williams 2013). Yet despite a wealth of research on how quota legislation leads to increased numerical, descriptive, and substantive representation, research has remained limited to examining such outcomes at the level of government for which these quotas were designed.…”