Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?*

Siegel, Susanna

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.003.0009

Cited by 43 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Second, biases of memory may cause certain experiences to be preferentially selected or deselected for uptake into belief-forming processes. Siegel (2012) proposes that such selection effects can make the resulting beliefs less worthy of being called knowledge because these selection effects cause individuals to improperly ignore information that should not be ignored given their purposes, or to improperly bypass experience that bears rationally on the beliefs they form. In Siegel's terms, selection effects "epistemically downgrade" resulting beliefs.…”

Section: Conclusion: "Seeing and Knowing Things As They Are"mentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing Attention and Decreasing Affective Bias: Toward a Cross-Cultural Cognitive Science of Mindfulness

Davis¹,

Thompson²

2017

Preprint

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Section: Conclusion: "Seeing and Knowing Things As They Are"mentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing Attention and Decreasing Affective Bias: Toward a Cross-Cultural Cognitive Science of Mindfulness

Davis¹,

Thompson²

2017

Preprint

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“…The general underlying question here – whether cognitive effects of these sorts, if they occur, are epistemically good or bad – is an important one and in need of further analysis. See Lyons () and Siegel (2013a; 2013b) for some recent discussion.…”

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confidence: 99%

Cognitive Penetration and the Perception of Art

Stokes

2014

Dialectica

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There are good, even if inconclusive, reasons to think that cognitive penetration of perception occurs: that cognitive states like belief causally affect, in a relatively direct way, the contents of perceptual experience. The supposed importance of -indeed as it is suggested here, what is definitive of -this possible phenomenon is that it would result in important epistemic and scientific consequences. One interesting and intuitive consequence entirely unremarked in the extant literature concerns the perception of art. Intuition has it that knowledge about art changes how one aesthetically evaluates artworks. A profound explanation of this intuitive fact is that perceptual experiences vary with artistic expertise. Cognitive penetration provides an explanatory mechanism for this latter effect. What one knows or otherwise thinks about art may affect, in one of two ways sketched below, how one perceives art. Differences in aesthetic evaluation may follow, either because high-level aesthetic properties can be perceptually represented or because they causally depend on low-level perceptible properties. All of this lends credence to the hypothesis that the expert better judges art because she better perceives art. And she better perceives art because she better knows art.

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“…Theorists working on these topics have often found Pylyshyn's notion of cognitive penetration as a semantically coherent impact of the content of thought on the content of perception to be useful in characterizing top‐down effects that have this sort of normative significance. It may turn out, however, that the epistemic significance of such effects does not require cognitive penetration in Pylyshyn's sense (Siegel, , p. 244), in which case the notion of semantically coherent causal effects may fail to play any philosophically important role.…”

Section: Larger Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, a fearful perceiver might boost signals pertaining to snake‐like features of ambiguous stimuli, resulting in a percept as of a snake (Prinz & Seidel, ). This instantiates a circular pattern whereby a fear‐state influences perception, and the percept then purports to justify the fear‐state (Siegel, , ).…”

Section: Larger Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Attention and encapsulation

Quilty‐Dunn

2019

Mind & Language

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The question of whether perception is encapsulated from cognition has been a major topic in the study of perception in the past decade. One locus of debate concerns the role of attention. Some theorists argue that attention is a vehicle for widespread violations of encapsulation; others argue that certain forms of cognitively driven attention are compatible with encapsulation, especially if attention only modulates inputs. This paper argues for an extreme thesis: no effect of attention, whether on the inputs to perception or on perceptual processing itself, constitutes a violation of the encapsulation of perception.

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Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?*

Cited by 43 publications

References 29 publications

Developing Attention and Decreasing Affective Bias: Toward a Cross-Cultural Cognitive Science of Mindfulness

Developing Attention and Decreasing Affective Bias: Toward a Cross-Cultural Cognitive Science of Mindfulness

Cognitive Penetration and the Perception of Art

Attention and encapsulation

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