Can't buy me votes? Campaign spending and the outcome of direct democratic votes

Abstract

Recent American studies that investigate the influence of money on the outcome of direct democratic votes find campaign spending effective for both supporters and challengers. Taking advantage of Switzerland's far-reaching experience with direct legislation, this article tests the role of money in a 'harder' context, where government plays an active role in direct democratic processes. It assesses the impact of campaign spending on 323 federal votes, and on a subset of 60 votes, offering finer-grained cantonal-level data. On the one hand, the results highlight the crucial role of the partisan coalition supporting the government for the outcome of votes; on the other hand, campaign spending is effective for both government and challenger camps, yet more so for the latter. Furthermore, the effects of government camp spending vary depending on the expected vote outcome and the difference in spending between both camps.

Integration Through Inclusion? Probing the Effect of Government Presence on Voting Behavior in the Swiss Cantons, 1848–2022

“…In other words, cantonal voting behavior is nested within cantons and specific votes, but the latter two are independent from each other (Gelman and Hill 2007, 289ff. ; also Jaquet et al 2022 for a similar approach). The main independent variable of interest, federal government membership, is also located at level 2 since it pertains to cantons.…”

“…The main independent variable of interest, federal government membership, is also located at level 2 since it pertains to cantons. Multilevel models offer a compromise between complete pooling (which ignores variation between cantons and votes) and no pooling (which ignores it through separate models for each canton or vote) (Jaquet et al 2022, 253 and 279). I model random intercepts at the level of cantons and votes because basic levels of turnout, for instance, could be inherently different across cantons.…”

“…Second, ahead of every popular vote, government members talk to the press and appear in other events to defend the official position, recommending either a "yes" or a "no" in answer to every referendum question (Trechsel and Sciarini 1998, 101ff. ;Jaquet et al 2022). To be sure, the government's position is defined by parliament, with both chambers having to agree on the recommendationand the recommendation is generally "no" for popular initiatives and "yes" for optional and mandatory referendums.…”

Referendum Campaigns in Hybrid Media Systems: Insights From the New Zealand Cannabis Legalisation Referendum

“…Although the results of empirical studies on the impact of campaign spending on public referenda remain inconclusive (i.e., some studies have found campaign spending against a ballot more effective than spending in favour, while other recent analyses argue that spending is similarly effective for both sides; see De Figueiredo et al, 2011;Garrett & Gerber, 2001;Jaquet et al, 2022;Lupia & Matsusaka, 2004), the size of campaigners' budgets does matter. As might be expected, the higher a campaigner's budget, the more resources and power they have to influence voters, including through advertising (Broder, 2001;De Figueiredo et al, 2011;Matsusaka, 2004).…”

Level Playing Field or Politics as Usual? Equalization–Normalization in Direct Democratic Online Campaigns

“…Direct democracy, together with federalism and consociationalism, is a central cornerstone of the Swiss political system (Vatter, 2020). The Swiss constitution provides for different elements of direct citizen participation, allowing for the creation, abolition, or modification of legislative norms: popular initiatives, optional, and mandatory referenda (Jaquet et al, 2022;Serdült, 2010). Since 1848, the Swiss electorate has voted on a total of 676 proposals at the national level (Swissvotes, 2022).…”