2019
DOI: 10.1086/700107
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Can the Government Deter Discrimination? Evidence from a Randomized Intervention in New York City

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 36 publications
(27 citation statements)
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“…In natural disasters, government messages should focus on information rather than blame assignment or mitigation (Liu, Lai, & Xu, 2018). Careful messaging from the government can deter a variety of negative social events, beyond crises, including ethnic discrimination (Fang, Guess, & Humphreys, 2019), increasing compliance with government recommendations (McAdams & Nadler, 2005), and decreasing support for separatist movements (Kamena & Utych, 2019). Indeed, in relation to the COVID-19 crisis, initial evidence suggests that, in Italy, government messaging (through observational analyses) is seen as believable and induces compliance, even among those who do not trust the government (Barari et al, 2020).Given the rapidly developing situation in the United States, we examine how the government can create effective messages to get citizens to comply with precautions to prevent the spread of COVID-T…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In natural disasters, government messages should focus on information rather than blame assignment or mitigation (Liu, Lai, & Xu, 2018). Careful messaging from the government can deter a variety of negative social events, beyond crises, including ethnic discrimination (Fang, Guess, & Humphreys, 2019), increasing compliance with government recommendations (McAdams & Nadler, 2005), and decreasing support for separatist movements (Kamena & Utych, 2019). Indeed, in relation to the COVID-19 crisis, initial evidence suggests that, in Italy, government messaging (through observational analyses) is seen as believable and induces compliance, even among those who do not trust the government (Barari et al, 2020).Given the rapidly developing situation in the United States, we examine how the government can create effective messages to get citizens to comply with precautions to prevent the spread of COVID-T…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Audit experiments are used to measure discrimination in a large number of domains (Employment: Bertrand et al (2004); Legislator responsiveness: Butler et al (2011); Housing: Fang et al (2018)). Audit studies all have in common that they estimate the average difference in response rates depending on randomly varied characteristics (such as the race or gender) of a requester.…”
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confidence: 99%
“…Likewise, they appear to get fewer chances than native-majority job seekers, even if they provide more information about their capacities, motivation, and personality (Agerström et al 2012;Andriessen et al 2010;Koopmans et al 2018). Despite the dearth of research on the effects of policy interventions to combat employment discrimination (Neumark 2018;Thijssen, 2020), it seems important to pay more attention to interventions aimed at formalizing hiring processes (Midtbøen 2015), anonymous applications (Krause, Rinne, and Zimmermann 2012), or stricter/proactive anti-discrimination policies by governments (Fang, Guess, and Humphreys 2018).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%