Can There Be Full Excuses for Morally Wrong Actions?*

Abstract

Most people (and philosophers) distinguish between performing a morally wrong action and being blameworthy for having performed that action, and believe that an individual can be fully excused for having performed a wrong action. My purpose is to reject this claim. More precisely, 1 defend what I call the "Dependence Claim": A's doing X is wrong only if A is blameworthy for having done X. I consider three cases in which, according to the traditional view, a wrong action could be excused: duress, mental illness, and mistake. I try to show that the reasons for excusing in either case are not relevantly distinguishable from the reasons for claiming that the prima facie wrong action is not wrong all things considered.

The Grounds of Excuses

“…According to these views, which I dub the Responsibility view, an agent is excusable for their action, because they are not responsible for their action, even though their action might be morally objectionable. This view is widely endorsed both in law and philosophy (Austin, 1957;Moore, 1990;Murphy, 2005;Baron, 2005Baron, , 2006Baron, , 2014Rivera-López, 2006;Segev, 2006;Westen, 2006;Franklin, 2013;Robison, 2019), and most famously by Austin: "a different way of going about [defending oneself] is to admit that it wasn't a good thing to have done, but to argue that it is not quite fair or correct to say baldly 'X did'" (Austin, 1957, p. 2). Unlike justification then, excusability does not make an action lawful or moral, nor a belief justified.…”

“…In the words of Marcia Baron, "I could consistently believe someone blameworthy for A without thinking it appropriate for anyone to blame her. I might hold that what she did was wrong and that there is nothing that excuses it, yet that there is no point, no value, in blaming her"(Baron, 2014, 96-97).3 For example:Austin, 1957;Brandt, 1969;Heintz, 1975;Greenawalt, 1986;Wallace, 1994;Baron, 2005;Rivera-López, 2006;Rosen, 2008;Kelly, 2012;Sliwa, 2019; Williamson forthcoming. 4 I take the present inquiry on excuse to apply to both actions and beliefs, as well as to moral and epistemic normativity.…”

Being Fully Excused for Wrongdoing

“…We might claim, for example, that although Dudley is culpable for firing Ralph, it would nonetheless not be appropriate for most of us to hold him responsible for his actions. This could be, for example, because we lack the standing to blame him for his blameworthy actions, given that we are very like to act similarly in an equivalent situation (Rivera‐López, 2006, p. 141), or because we are simply morally required to sometimes ‘cut others some slack’ when they are only marginally culpable and their action does furthermore not spring from any serious malice or disregard for morality (Baron, 2007, p. 34). Given that those embracing the Dual Role Response must hold that the cases of full excuse are both fewer than one might initially assume, and that the balance of reasons is only barely sufficient for grounding a prohibition, resisting the Standard View through these alternative strategies of accounting for the inappropriateness of blame becomes much more viable once its defenders are forced into adopting the Dual Role Response by the three‐option‐cases.…”

“…My argument is to a large extent compatible with some other recent attacks on this view by R. J. Wallace (1994, ch. 5) and Eduardo Rivera‐López (2006) but has what I take to be a significant advantage over them: It does not rely on any substantial presuppositions about what unifies the quite diverse class of excuses. My aim is to challenge the classical understanding of excuses as faultless wrongdoing by putting pressure on one of its driving motivations, namely, the appeal to distinctly identifiable excusing considerations.…”

The problem with moralism

“…Some reject the claim that it is possible to act wrongly and to have an excuse. For example, Rivera‐López (). I will skip over this complication as it has no major consequences for my discussion, those who reject this claim can simply ignore my claim that this is one of the ways in which moral pressure can be inappropriate.…”