Can there be vague objects?

Evans, Gareth

doi:10.1093/analys/38.4.208

Cited by 289 publications

(51 citation statements)

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“…Let ∇ be the dual possibility operator, which we can conveniently regard as expressing semantic possibility. This accords with the notation in Evans (1978).…”

Section: (B) ¬ (P (A)) ∧ ¬ (¬P (A))supporting

confidence: 82%

Vagueness, tolerance and contextual logic

Gaifman

2010

Synthese

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The goal of this paper is a comprehensive analysis of basic reasoning patterns that are characteristic of vague predicates. The analysis leads to rigorous reconstructions of the phenomena within formal systems. Two basic features are dealt with. One is tolerance: the insensitivity of predicates to small changes in the objects of predication (a one-increment of a walking distance is a walking distance). The other is the existence of borderline cases. The paper shows why these should be treated as different, though related phenomena. Tolerance is formally reconstructed within a proposed framework of contextual logic, leading to a solution of the Sorites paradox. Borderline-vagueness is reconstructed using certain modality operators; the set-up provides an analysis of higher order vagueness and a derivation of scales of degrees for the property in question.

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“…Let ∇ be the dual possibility operator, which we can conveniently regard as expressing semantic possibility. This accords with the notation in Evans (1978).…”

Section: (B) ¬ (P (A)) ∧ ¬ (¬P (A))supporting

confidence: 82%

Vagueness, tolerance and contextual logic

Gaifman

2010

Synthese

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“…In this case, clearly, such formal inconsistencies could be taken as genuine ontological axioms of, e.g., a foundational ontology that is grounded in the philosophy of dialetheism. Another example for this case would be ontologies that accept the existence of vague objects [58] (e.g. 'a mountain with vague boundaries') or impossible objects [156] (e.g.…”

Section: (Being Present At T) P Re(x T)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Carnap, Goguen, and the Hyperontologies: Logical Pluralism and Heterogeneous Structuring in Ontology Design

2010

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This paper addresses questions of universality related to ontological engineering, namely aims at substantiating (negative) answers to the following three basic questions: (i) Is there a 'universal ontology' ?, (ii) Is there a 'universal formal ontology language' ?, and (iii) Is there a universally applicable 'mode of reasoning' for formal ontologies? To support our answers in a principled way, we present a general framework for the design of formal ontologies resting on two main principles: firstly, we endorse Rudolf Carnap's principle of logical tolerance by giving central stage to the concept of logical heterogeneity, i.e. the use of a plurality of logical languages within one ontology design. Secondly, to structure and combine heterogeneous ontologies in a semantically wellfounded way, we base our work on abstract model theory in the form of institutional semantics, as forcefully put forward by Joseph Goguen and Rod Burstall. In particular, we employ the structuring mechanisms of the heterogeneous algebraic specification language HetCasl for defining a general concept of heterogeneous, distributed, highly modular and structured ontologies, called hyperontologies. Moreover, we distinguish, on a structural and semantic level, several different kinds of combining and aligning heterogeneous ontologies, namely integration, connection, and refinement. We show how the notion of heterogeneous refinement can be used to provide both a general notion of sub-ontology as well as a notion of heterogeneous equivalence of ontologies, and finally sketch how different modes of reasoning over ontologies are related to these different structuring aspects.Mathematics Subject Classification (2010). Primary 68T30; Secondary 03C95.

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“…One might think that such indeterminacy should be eschewed due to the impossibility of indeterminate identity between any x and y. cf. (Evans 1978;Salmon 1982). (Baker 2007) reports agreement with Salmon and Evans. perspective y can be indeterminate, since if it couldn't be, we would get the absurd result noted above that one slight turn of a dial could mean the difference between survival and death.…”

Section: (Fission)mentioning

confidence: 99%