Dividends can provide a tangible signal of earnings, but this function depends upon characteristics of financial reporting that were not always present in early financial capitalism. Although eighteenth-century English canal companies offered low-risk securitized capital approved by Parliament and were important to the development of financial capitalism, little is known about the economic state of the canal industry, beyond observed dividend levels. This article estimates rates of return on equity for a set of major English canals, but shows that their financial reporting underrepresented equity inputs so that dividend rates did not reliably signal operating returns or equity-based rates of return.e hr_541 214..236 A lthough financial or managerial capitalism provides more choice to investors than most other economic systems, the rationality of investor decisions is limited by the information available. In a world with considerable imperfections in accounting measurements of earnings, assets, and ownership capital (in this article the term 'capital' is used to denote sources of finance, rather than business assets), dividends are widely seen as a signal of operating performance that is tangible, in that it is paid in cash form and less subject to manipulation than earnings. Thus they are seen as providing a tolerably accurate indicator of 'real' operating performance.The value of the firm can be seen as a function of its earning power and of its asset risk levels, although under conditions of information asymmetry, investors will be imperfectly informed about organizational earnings. If dividends affect the value of the firm, they 'do so solely because of their informational content, which signals management's earnings expectations', at least in capital markets that have no imperfections, taxes, or transaction costs, and where managers can be assumed to be reluctant to vary their firm's dividend levels. 2 Dividends appear to have fulfilled this function under a range of financial reporting regimes, but this article argues that this ability is in fact dependent upon characteristics of the financial reporting system that are not always present and which were, in fact, absent during the early stages of financial capitalism. As a result, dividends in some cases mis-signalled organizational performance in the canal industry, central to the first industrial revolution in England, under