2006
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0126-y
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Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences

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Cited by 15 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…While spoiler effects have long been a familiar subject in the field of voting theory, there have been relatively few attempts to formally define spoilers or to measure the immunity of electoral systems to spoilers. However, spoiler effects have been tangentially considered in classical social choice theory primarily in the context of stronger postulates such as independence of irrelevant alternatives [1,46,8] or candidate stability [19,20,22,48] or otherwise distinct though related postulates such as the independence of clones [52].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While spoiler effects have long been a familiar subject in the field of voting theory, there have been relatively few attempts to formally define spoilers or to measure the immunity of electoral systems to spoilers. However, spoiler effects have been tangentially considered in classical social choice theory primarily in the context of stronger postulates such as independence of irrelevant alternatives [1,46,8] or candidate stability [19,20,22,48] or otherwise distinct though related postulates such as the independence of clones [52].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They also show that for the voting rule that outputs the sophisticated outcome for voting by successive elimination, the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed. Some of these results are discussed further (together with simpler proofs) by Ehlers and Weymark [8], and extended to voting correspondences by Ereslan [9] and Rodriguez [15], and to probabilistic voting rules by Rodriguez [14]. Brill and Conitzer [4] extend the analysis to also include strategic behavior by the voters.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They study stability of the existing members while we focus on the stability of candidates as new entrants. Literature on candidate stability includes Ehlers and Weymark (2003), Eraslan and McLennan (2004), Rodríguez-Álvarez (2005Rodríguez-Álvarez ( , 2006, and Samejima (2005Samejima ( , 2007.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%