Capacity testing the youth: a proposal for broader enfranchisement

Abstract

In this article, I claim that at least some young people have the requisite capacity for political participation, and that the exclusion of these young people is in breach of the reasonable expectation that all capable citizens are included in democratic processes. I suggest implementing a capacity test for those under the current age of majority. I outline a system of capacity testing for the youth, distinguish this proposal from prior attempts to justify capacity testing and argue that a suitably constrained capacity testing regime is not simply defensible, but superior to the current system, which arbitrarily excludes some capable members of society from participation. Finally, I explain why only this limited capacity testing regime is acceptable.

Toward a Developmental Science of Politics

“…Unsurprisingly, a wide spectrum of opinions about youth suffrage exists between the two opposing viewpoints mentioned above. Much has been written about political “capacity testing,” whereby all citizens—regardless of age—would need to demonstrate their “political capacity” before being granted the right to vote (Cook, ; Lau, ; Munn, ). To support her argument, Lau () pointed out the hypocrisy of denying children the right to vote by using age as a proxy for political capacity.…”

“…They also believed that most adults were skeptical of allowing youth to vote precisely because they were not cognitively mature enough to do so. Munn () provided a detailed description of how various scholars foresee capacity testing being integrated into current political structures.…”

Political Inclusion as a Means of Generating Justice for Children

“…Another option would be to grant proxy votes to parents or caregivers until such time as children reach the age of majority, thereby enabling their interests to be taken into consideration without burdening the child with the responsibility of voting (Wolf, Goldschmidt, & Petersen, 2015;Wall, 2014). I take it, however, that it is both simpler and more defensible to let children vote once they can competently do so (Munn, 2012b). Further, I believe that many very young children can do so, which means that the group excluded after accounting for capacity for political participation is relatively small (Munn, 2018).…”

“…As such, there is potential for the improvement of global justice for children through the institution in any particular context of equal political participation for children -the state which did this would be an exemplar, whether of the risks or the benefits of inclusion. For reasons I have discussed elsewhere, at length, I am convinced that the result of such a move towards the inclusion of the young would be beneficial, not just for the children who are enfranchised, but for the democracy which enfranchises them, and for the other citizens within that democracy (Munn, 2012a(Munn, , 2012b(Munn, , 2014(Munn, , 2018. This is because democratic participation is a means to a range of positive ends, or, as Lansdown puts it, "democratic participation is not just an end in itself.…”

“…I have elsewhere made the case that the exclusion of children from the franchise is unjustified, but in those articles, I have not been concerned with developing a positive account of the benefits to democracy and to children, that could be gained from their political inclusion. Rather, I had focused solely on the injustice of their exclusion (Munn, 2012a(Munn, , 2012b(Munn, , 2014. Here, while the injustice of the exclusion of children from the franchise remains important, I also explore the benefits of inclusion, as a means of further strengthening the case.…”