Capital punishment in China: A populist instrument of social governance

Abstract

Contrary to the assumption that authoritarian authorities are insensitive to popular demands for justice, the Chinese penal regime has been highly attentive and responsive to public sentiments since its early days. As an instrument for the authorities to govern the country in the name of the people, capital punishment functioned as a tool for political struggles in Maoist China and later served as a tool to fight crimes in Deng’s reform era. Nowadays, the demands of the masses for revenge, justice and equality have been translated into a fervent passion for capital punishment for certain offences and offenders. By reaching out to satisfy these public demands and sentiments, the party-state hopes to enhance its political legitimacy. In this sense, the death penalty serves as a populist mechanism to strengthen the resilience of the authoritarian party-state by venting public anxiety and resentment towards social problems created in the processes of China’s rapid modernization and social fragmentation.

A Case Study of Chinese Netizens’ Opinions on Capital Punishment: Diversity, Rationale, and Interaction

“…For instance, many of Lin’s supporters questioned his death sentence because they saw it as disproportionately harsh compared to other crimes/criminals (e.g., corrupt officials). Official corruption, in fact, is one of few issues that generated no disagreement among netizens, which may signal future difficulty in restricting the use of capital punishment in corruption crimes (see Miao, 2013). The lesson is that to change people’s opinions, more structural changes to the existing systems might be necessary.…”

“…As Fu argued, Chinese penal populism often targets individual cases and tries to influence judicial sentencing instead of legislation and/or governmental policies. Facing pressure from this form of minyi, Chinese courts find themselves in the difficult position of trying to uphold the law, responding to minyi, and maintaining a “harmonious society” all at the same time (Miao, 2013). Moreover, the impact of this kind of minyi on cases is very unpredictable, as it is influenced by factors such as the media, judicial rulings, and actions by administrations (Tang and Wang, 2007; Zuo, 2009).…”

Criminal Justice Reform in the Xi Jinping Era

“…Innovations that followed included the widespread take-up of an existing practice of criminal mediation (xingshi tiaojie) for some offenders on death row. This is a practice where offenders in some homicide cases can be given a reduced sentence if they pay the victim's family an acceptable amount of compensation (Johnson and Zimring 2009;Miao 2013;Trevaskes 2012). Reforms in the arena of minor criminal cases produced capacity for more lenient sentencing than in the past, with innovations ranging from conditional nonprosecution to the introduction of a new criminal reconciliation process in handling minor crime (Shi 2008;Trevaskes 2009;Ng and He 2016.…”

“…Believed to be the son of a rich family, Yao's case attracted significant public attention and arising angry sentiments supporting his execution. public trust in the law (Belkin 2017;Fu 2016a;Miao 2013;Trevaskes 2013aTrevaskes , 2015Zhao & Yuan 2013). After the end of the Stability Maintenance and Harmonious Society era, central Party authorities encouraged the SPC to expand its authority over local courts and to limit local discretion by embedding its own judicial guidance within the wide interpretive space of judicial discretion, in the form of SPC interpretations, policy and model cases.P 20F 21 P These initiatives include the case guidance system controlled by the SPC.…”