Caps on Political Lobbying

Che, Yeon‐Koo; Gale, Ian

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_19

Cited by 172 publications

(238 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…On the one hand, when x = 0, the model reduces to the previous models of sequential bargaining with an exogenous recognition process. 9 On the other hand, when x = 0, and players put no weight on the future or acceptance of a proposal requires only one vote, the model coincides with the standard rent-seeking model, in which a group of players compete to win a fixed prize. In general, though, agents will compete to win the endogenous and possibly different prizes from proposing that are determined through the bargaining process.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 73%

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Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition

Yıldırım

2007

Journal of Economic Theory

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This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents' effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal.

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 73%

“…See, e.g., Che and Gale [9], Esteban and Ray [12], Leininger [20], and Nti [26]. Viewed as a one-shot rent-seeking game in equilibrium, agents in the present bargaining setup are identical with respect to the prize they compete for.…”

Section: Proposition 3 Suppose P I (X) Satisfies A2 and The Voting mentioning

confidence: 99%

Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition

Yıldırım

2007

Journal of Economic Theory

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“…Let X A ≤ X B , and define the modified budgets asX A = min{X A , nv/2} andX B = min{X B , nvX A /2}. 3 In the case that the players enter the same bid in a given contest, it is assumed that player B wins the auction if the common bid is X A , otherwise each player wins the auction with equal probability. The specification of the tie-breaking rule does not affect the results as long as (2/n)X B ≤X A .…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A range of tie-breaking rules yield similar results. 3 As shown in Appendix A,X i corresponds to the equilibrium expected expenditure for player i. This specification ofX i allows for a unified treatment of the three possible cases: (a) neither player using all of her available resources, (b) only the weaker player (A) using all of her available resources, and (c) both players A and B using all of their available resources.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The presence of the budget constraints gives rise to strategic considerations which are reminiscent of those arising in the single all-pay auction with budgetconstrained bidders (see Che and Gale (1998)). However, in the non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game the budget constraints hold not within one auction but across the entire set of auctions.…”

Section: The Non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

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The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game

Roberson

Kvasov

2011

Econ Theory

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThe Colonel Blotto game is a two-player constant-sum game in which each player simultaneously distributes her fixed level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players' resources are "use it or lose it" in the sense that any resources which are not allocated to one of the contests are forfeited. This paper examines a non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game which relaxes this use it or lose it feature. We find that if the level of asymmetry between the players' budgets is below a threshold, then the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions of the non-constant-sum game is equivalent up to an affine transformation to the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions of the constant-sum game. Once the asymmetry of the players' budgets exceeds the threshold we construct a new equilibrium.JEL Code: C7.

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Investing Even in Uneven Contests: Effects of Asymmetry on Investment in Contests

Hart

Avrahami

Kareev

et al. 2015

Behavioral Decision Making

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Many competitions, such as political campaigns, innovative endeavors, sports, or courting rituals, require investment of nonrefundable resources: One contestant wins the prize for the invested amount, whereas all others lose their investments without receiving compensation. Frequently, contests are asymmetric, because of differing resources or prize valuations. Does asymmetry discourage the weaker contestants from investing? Do stronger contestants take this into account and also invest less? Or does the desire to win abolish these differences? Two experiments explored the effects of asymmetry between the contestants-arising from their resources or prizes-on nonrefundable investments. Subjects repeatedly competed in both symmetric and asymmetric contests, enabling within-subject comparisons. We observed an effect of asymmetry only when it concerned resources: Subjects overall invested less when their resources were unequal, whereas inequality in the prizes did not influence investments. This pattern suggests that winning itself is motivating. The changes between consecutive investments can be explained by reactions to the previous outcome (win or loss): Across all contests, investment decreased following a win and increased following a loss.

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Caps on Political Lobbying

Cited by 172 publications

References 11 publications

Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition

Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition

The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game

Investing Even in Uneven Contests: Effects of Asymmetry on Investment in Contests

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